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Abstract 
Social Security provides retirement benefits to age-eligible workers and their spouses. Benefits are 
permanently increased if initial receipt is delayed. For benefits paid to spouses, these incentives reflect 
a complex interaction of the worker’s and spouse’s earnings histories, benefit claiming decisions, and 
age difference. We demonstrate that the benefit increment from delaying initial receipt of spousal and 
survivor benefits is substantial for some households. Past studies find that workers respond to potential 
increments in their own benefit by delaying labor force exit. Using a nationally representative panel, we 
investigate whether an additional dollar in expected lifetime benefits paid to the worker directly is 
treated the same as an additional dollar paid to the worker’s spouse from spouse and survivor benefits. 
We find minimal evidence that workers or their spouses change retirement behavior in a way that is 
theoretically consistent with spouse and survivor benefit claiming incentives. The lack of 
responsiveness suggests that incentives to delay claiming for benefits other than the worker’s own are 
not salient in the worker’s decision-making. This may reflect the complexity of benefit rules or different 
preferences concerning benefits paid to others. A parallel analysis using German data, where rules 
surrounding survivor benefits are simpler, finds that workers respond in a theoretically consistent way, 
but small sample sizes prevent conclusive results. Our findings suggest models estimating the policy 
impact of reducing spousal and survivor benefits on female labor supply are likely overstated, and that 
a greater understanding of survivor benefits may lead to better claiming decisions for couples. 
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Social insurance-based public pensions, such as the social security systems in 
the United States and Germany, were developed to insure financial security for 
individuals in old age, dependents after death, or disabled individuals.1 While these 
plans may be designed to be actuarially fair, differences in generational and gender 
mortality often mean these public pensions provide financial incentives to continue or 
stop working. An important role is played by the earliest eligibility age (EEA), which 
determines the youngest age an individual may begin receiving benefits. Additionally, 
many pension systems increase monthly payment amounts if an individual delays 
benefit claiming (i.e., the start of benefit payments). Sometimes, these are framed as 
penalties for claiming benefits before reaching a specific age. In the United States, both 
framings exist: a delayed retirement credit that individuals can receive if they start their 
benefit after “full retirement age” (FRA) and a reduction of benefits if receipt begins prior 
to the FRA.  
Public pensions often provide insurance in case a family’s income earner 
becomes unable to work or dies. These benefits, known as auxiliary benefits, introduce 
additional financial incentives to shift benefit receipt, depending on a beneficiary’s 
circumstances.  
The complexity of a pension system may make its designed incentives less 
                                               
1 We compare the U.S. and Germany in this paper given the many similarities between the two 
systems, including basing benefit levels on earnings histories, having survivor benefits, 
providing incentives to delay the start of benefits, and similar eligibility ages for earliest and full 
benefits. 
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salient to the beneficiaries. Some of these incentives are complex and so may not be 
broadly understood, limiting most individuals’ ability to respond to them. For example, in 
the U.S., the FRA varies by birth year, as do increases in lifetime monthly payments 
from delayed benefit start. The complexity is compounded for auxiliary benefits, as 
variation in FRA by birth year and increases for delayed start differ between retirement 
benefits paid to a worker and benefits paid to his or her spouse or survivor. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that people respond to pension incentives. 
In this paper, we affirm these findings and analyze whether individuals also respond to 
the additional incentives implicitly built into auxiliary benefits. We focus on Social 
Security’s spousal and survivor benefits. We examine whether our findings are 
consistent with these benefits being salient for retirement and benefit-claiming 
decisions. For example, when considering the gains in lifetime Social Security benefits 
from continuing to work and delaying the start of benefits, does a worker weigh an 
additional dollar of expected lifetime income paid to his or her survivor the same as an 
additional dollar of expected lifetime income paid to themselves? Do we observe a 
relationship between additional expected lifetime income from survivor benefits and an 
individual’s retirement timing?  
Social Security’s spousal and survivor benefits of retired or deceased workers 
amounted to $130 billion (U.S. Social Security Administration 2019), or 3.2% of federal 
expenditures in 2018 and 14.8% of old-age and survivors insurance expenditures.2 
Since auxiliary benefits come at a substantial cost, it is important for policymakers to 
                                               
2 Annual estimates are from author’s calculations using December 2018 average monthly 
benefits as reporting in Tables 5A.1 and 5G.4 of the 2019 Social Security Annual Statistical 
Supplment (U.S. Social Security Administration 2019).  
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understand the effectiveness of these benefits and their incentives. A worker’s 
contributions support those benefits regardless of whether the insurance is relevant to 
them (e.g., the contributions of a single worker who does not benefit from survivor 
benefits are determined the same way as those of a married worker). It is an open 
question as to whether workers respond to the retirement incentives created by those 
auxiliary benefits. If they do not, then there are two possible explanations. First, it could 
be that workers do not place high value on those benefits. Second, the complexity of the 
structure of auxiliary benefits may limit their influence on decision-making. As 
policymakers contemplate future reforms, auxiliary benefits may be a potential area of 
interest.  
To understand the relative impact of auxiliary benefits versus own benefits on 
retirement timing, we conduct parallel analyses of both the U.S. and Germany using the 
same methodology and harmonized data sources. The U.S. Social Security system was 
modeled on the German social insurance system, which was  introduced in 1889 (U.S. 
Social Security Administration 2021). Since then, the German pension system, has 
undergone a number of revisions. In the current state mandatory pension system, 
Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung (GRV), individuals accrue credits over their life cycle, 
and these credits transform into a permanent benefit. There also exist incentives to 
delay claiming through increases in the per-credit benefit rate. Importantly, as we will 
discuss later in this paper, the survivor benefit is notably simpler than the U.S. benefit.  
In the next section, we provide pertinent institutional details on the U.S. and 
German mandatory pension schemes, and illustrate how U.S. spousal and survivor 
benefits can provide sizeable incentives to a worker to either start receiving their benefit 
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as soon as possible or delay. In the third section, we introduce our data, discuss our 
sample selection, and present summary statistics about our population. The fourth 
section presents our economic model and discusses identification and interpretation of 
our model parameters. The fifth section presents our findings and discusses the model’s 
results. We conclude with a summary of key findings, including policy implications, and 
note potential paths for future research. 
2. Household incentives in public pension design 
A. Institutional details for the U.S. 
Old Age, Survivor, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), typically referred to as 
Social Security in the U.S., was established in 1935, expanded in 1939 to include 
benefits for wives and widows, and gradually expanded through the 1970s to include 
husbands and widowers. Since a major reform in 1983 to stabilize long-term financing, 
no substantial reforms have been made.3 The durability of Social Security’s benefit 
structure has provided reliable expectations about income to generations of households 
planning their retirement.  
We focus on three major benefits of OASDI for our analysis: own retirement 
benefits, spousal retirement benefits, and survivor retirement benefits. We exclude 
disability benefits, as well as the range of other auxiliary benefits (e.g., benefits for 
                                               
3 Minor reforms included the Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act of 2000 that eliminated the 
Retirement Earnings Test for beneficiaries at or above FRA and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 
2015 which eliminated a “file and suspend” strategy for couples. This strategy enabled one 
member of the couple to file for their benefit at or after FRA but suspend their own payment, 
allowing their spouse to collect a spousal benefit while simultaneously receiving delayed 
retirement credits on their own benefit.  
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worker’s children or parents, or workers who happen to be mothers or fathers of 
children younger than 18), that are not directly aimed at those nearing retirement. We 
refer to individuals covered by OASDI as workers (including self-employed) and 
distinguish between high and lower earnings in a couple by referring to the current 
higher earner as the primary worker and the lower earner as the secondary worker. 
Throughout this paper, we use the terminology “own” to highlight benefits paid to a 
worker based on his or her own working history. 
In its current form, workers contribute 6.2% of their earned income to OASDI, 
with employers contributing an equal amount, up to a statutory maximum (set at 
$142,800 in 2021). Contributions are independent of household circumstance.  
Workers are entitled to start receiving their own and spousal old-age benefits at 
an EEA of 62. EEA for survivor old-age benefits is age 60. The FRA is age 65 for 
workers born before 1938 and increases by two months every birth year until it reaches 
66 for workers born between 1943 and 1954. For workers born after 1954, it increases 
by two months every birth year until it reaches 67 for workers born after 1959. 
An individual’s benefit amount is determined by calculating his or her average 
indexed monthly earnings. That measure is based on his or her best 35 years of 
earnings, indexed for wage growth over time using the Social Security Administration’s 
average wage index.4 Earnings up to the two years prior to his or her EEA (i.e., age 60 
for own benefits) are indexed to age-60 dollars, while earnings after are not indexed. 
Average indexed monthly earnings is transformed to a primary insurance amount (PIA) 
based on a progressive rule; In 2021, the PIA would be 90% of the first $996 of average 
                                               
4 Earnings over the taxable maximum do not count toward average indexed monthly earnings. 
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indexed monthly earnings, 32% of the next $5,006, and 15% of the remaining amount.5  
The PIA is the own benefit a worker would be entitled to at his or her FRA. Own 
benefits are reduced if receipt starts before FRA and increased if receipt starts after 
FRA. These increments depend on birth year. Table 2.1 demonstrates the fraction of 
PIA a worker born in 1950 would be eligible to receive at eligible claiming ages. A 
worker’s spouse is entitled to the higher of his or her own benefit or 50% of the worker’s 
benefit, whichever is greater. Spousal benefits are reduced based on the spouse’s age, 
but not by the worker’s claiming age. However, a worker must have claimed their benefit 
in order for the spouse to collect spousal benefits. If a worker dies before starting his or 
her own retirement benefit, then the survivor is entitled to the deceased’s PIA. If a 
worker dies after starting his or her own retirement benefit, then the survivor is entitled 
to the benefit level they were receiving. These benefits are further reduced depending 
on the age at which the survivor begins receiving benefits. Survivor benefits can never 
be less than 71.5% of the deceased’s PIA. Table 2.1 depicts the case of benefit 
reductions for a scenario where the survivor and deceased claim at the same age.  
  
                                               
5 The thresholds in the PIA calculation change annually in keeping with Social Security’s 
average wage index, but the valuation of each range (i.e., 90, 32, and 15%) does not. 
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Table 2.1: Entitlements based on claim age as percent of worker’s benefit at FRA  
Age Own benefit Spousal benefit
































60      71.5%  
61      76.25%  
62 75% 50% 70% 35.0% 75% 81% 71.5% 
63 80% 50% 75% 37.5% 80% 85.75% 71.5% 
64 86.7% 50% 83.3% 41.7% 86.7% 90.5% 78.5% 
65 93.3% 50% 91.7% 45.9% 93.3% 95.25% 88.9% 
66 (FRA) 100% 50% 100% 50% 100% 100% 100% 
67 108% 50% 100% 50% 108% 100% 108% 
68 116% 50% 100% 50% 116% 100% 116% 
69 124% 50% 100% 50% 124% 100% 124% 
70+ 132% 50% 100% 50% 132% 100% 132% 
Note: Values reflect rules for a worker born between 1943 and 1954. Age 60 is the EEA for 
survivor benefits and age 62 is the EEA for own and spousal benefits. Spousal benefit 
adjustment is based only on the spouse’s benefit claiming age. Survivor benefits are reduced for 
the claiming behavior of the survivor and the deceased, but can never be less than 71.5% of the 
deceased’s PIA. (1) Beneficiaries of spousal and survivor benefits receive an amount equal to 
the greater of the amount based on their own entitlement or the percent of the worker’s PIA 
depicted in the table. (2)The spouse can only claim combined percent of the worker’s PIA if the 
worker has also claimed. (3) Combined survivor benefits as presented in this column assume 
deceased and survivor claimed at same age and that the deceased claimed prior to death. The 
table can also be used to calculate the reduction factor for other combinations. If, for example, 
the worker claims at age 67 and the survivor claims at age 61, then the combined reduction 
factor would be 108% times 76.25%, or 82.35%. If the worker instead claims at 62 and the 
survivor claims at 61, then the reduction factor would be determined by the 71.5% floor. If the 
deceased does not claim his or her benefits before death, then the primary reduction factor is 
100% plus any credits for delaying retirement past FRA. 
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Mathematically, a worker i’s own benefit at time t  is determined by the worker’s 
claiming age (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖), birth year (𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖), and a vector of lifetime earnings, EARNit. accrued 
through period 𝑡𝑡:  
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜.𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) × 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖)   (2.1) 
where 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(⋅) reflects adjustments to benefits due to claiming them before or 
after the FRA and FRA depends on birth year.6 The next term, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎(⋅) stands for the 
function for computing the worker’s PIA based on 𝑝𝑝’s life-cycle earnings, indexing 
earnings before age 60, and accounting for a progressive formula described above for 
transforming average earnings into the monthly benefit at FRA. The final term in 
Equation 2.1, 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎(⋅), corresponds to the cost-of-living adjustment for person 𝑝𝑝 in year 𝑡𝑡 
as set by the U.S. Social Security Administration. Benefit payments are adjusted 
annually for cost-of-living based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price 
Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers. These adjustments are 
compounded annually from the year an individual reaches the EEA.7 Combining all of 
this for a more concrete example, in 2019, an individual whose average indexed 
monthly earnings was equal to the average wage ($54,100) would have been entitled to 
an annual benefit at FRA of $24,641. 
Equations for the spouse j’s spousal benefit (𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) and survivor benefits 
                                               
6 See “Worker Claiming Age Reduction Factor” in Table 2.1 for an example, Appendix Table B.1 
for reductions in PIA by claiming age relative to FRA and Appendix Table B.2 for FRA by birth 
year. 
7 So, for an individual claiming at FRA, his or her initial benefit would be approximately equal to 
the PIA multiplied by the compounded cost-of-living adjustments between age 62 and FRA. It 
is approximate because Social Security policy requires that for each annual benefit adjustment 
the benefit is rounded down to the nearest $0.10. 
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(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) at time t based on worker i’s earnings history are defined in Appendix A. 
The key impact of a worker’s claiming decision, as illustrated in Table 2.1, on spousal 
and survivor benefit payments are that the worker needs to claim his benefit for his 
spouse to receive spousal benefits, and the worker’s claiming decision prior to death 
influences the benefit his survivor will receive. 
To illustrate the interrelationship of household claiming behavior in OASDI, 
consider the following example of two couples (assume all individuals claim at their 
FRA). Couple A is a single-income household, where the worker’s PIA is $2,000 and the 
nonworker is not entitled to benefits on their own earnings history. The nonworker would 
be entitled to $1,000 of spousal benefits, for a household benefit of $3,000. If either die, 
then the survivor would be entitled to the worker’s PIA amount of $2,000 (67% of the 
predeath household benefit). Additional incentives from spousal and survivor benefits to 
delay claiming, as noted in Table 2.1, would apply to this household. Alternatively, 
Couple B is a dual-income household, where each individual has a PIA of $1,000. The 
combined own entitlement is $2,000, the same as Couple A. However, they would not 
receive the $1,000 spousal benefits, so their household benefit, at $2,000, would be 
lower than Couple A’s. If either dies, then the survivor would be entitled to the higher of 
her own benefit or the survivor benefit.  In this case, they are equal at $1,000. (As a 
result the survivor would receive only 50% of the predeath household benefit, which is 
also only 50% of Couple A’s survivor benefit). Additional incentives from spousal and 
survivor benefits to delay the start of benefits, as noted in Table 2.1, would not apply to 
this household because they do not claim spousal and survivor benefits. This example 
illustrates that couples where the individuals have differing earnings histories will 
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receive larger payments based on the design of spousal and survivor benefits and, 
therefore, will have greater incentive to respond to the benefits’ design when 
determining when to claim their own benefits.8 
B. Measuring the value of lifetime pension flows 
While benefit payments capture a claiming decision’s value at a point-in-time, 
they do not represent the tradeoff between a greater monthly payment from delayed 
claiming compared to fewer years of that payment, nor the lost opportunity cost of 
receiving that money at a later time. Researchers have developed a measure meant to 
capture these tradeoffs called social security wealth (SSW). SSW reflects the 
cumulative, expected, present-discounted value of all current and future pension benefit 
payments. In this section, we use SSW to illustrate that entitlements to spousal and 
survivor benefits can meaningfully change a married couple’s total payments and 
incentives to delay claiming. First, we briefly introduce how we estimate SSW and the 
incentive to delay claiming. A more detailed discussion is in Appendix A.  
Estimating social security wealth and the incentive to delay claiming 
To estimate SSW, we first estimate earnings histories and then use these 
histories to estimate potential future benefits if the individual continues to work. In brief, 
                                               
8 An alternative way to look at this would be to equate contribution histories through assuming 
the same average monthly earnings.  If we repeat the above exercise with a single-income 
household with average monthly earnings of $6,000 and a dual-income household with 
average monthly earnings of $3,000 each, then the PIA for the single income household would 
be approximately $2,500 and $1,600, respectively. When the couple is alive, the dual-income 
household receives $3,200/$3,750  = 85% of the single income household’s benefit.  After the 
primary income earner has deceased, the survivor receives $1,600/$2,500 = 64% of the since 
income household’s benefit. At higher incomes, the difference between single- and dual-
income households becomes smaller, but never converges. 
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we use last observed earnings and average life-cycle earnings trajectories to estimate 
an earnings history for each worker at each interview wave. Benefit payments for the 
worker are then estimated based on Equation 2.1 and for spousal and survivor benefits 
using appendix Equations A.3 and A.4 (described in words above). Collectively, these 
reflect benefits paid to the worker and his or her spouse based on the worker’s earnings 
history. To simplify this computation, we assume that the spouse will claim at the EEA 
(if younger than the EEA) or immediately (if older). A worker’s benefit payment may be 
supplemented by benefits he or she is entitled to based on his or her spouse’s earnings 
history (i.e., spousal or survivor benefits paid to the worker). These benefits, which we 
refer to as supplemental benefits paid to the worker (or “worker’s supplement” for 
brevity). A worker’s supplement may reduce his or her gains from delayed claiming. For 
example, if a worker’s benefit is supplemented by a spousal benefit based on his 
spouse’s earnings history, then earnings from additional years he works may not 
influence the benefit he is paid.  
A worker i’s own pension benefit (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ) depends on claiming age, the 
worker’s earnings history up to time t and the benefit formula in country c. Own SSW 
(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ) is a measure of the expected, discounted value of all future own pension 
benefits. Thus: 
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = ∑ �
𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡
inf (𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖)
� × 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 × Pr(survive to 𝑠𝑠)𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠=𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  (2.2) 
where 𝛽𝛽 is a real discount factor, inf (𝑡𝑡2, 𝑡𝑡1) is the cumulative inflation between 𝑡𝑡1 and 
future period 𝑡𝑡2. Pr(survive to 𝑠𝑠) represents the probability of individual i surviving to a 
future period s. Survival probabilities are age- and gender-specific and are based on 
predictions from the Human Mortality Database (2021), using data provided by the 
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National Center for Health Statistics (2021). We calculate SSW present value at the 
claiming age back to the survey period, time t. 
Additional SSW from spousal and survivor benefits (𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 , 
respectively) based on the worker’s earnings history are more complex because they 
depend on the interrelationship between the spouse’s claiming decisions, the spouse’s 
own benefit entitlement, and the expected survivorship of both. Given its complexity, we 
detail this computation in Appendix A (Equations A.8 and A.9).  We also compute 
additional SSW from the worker’s supplement (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ), which is benefits paid to the 
worker based on his or her spouse’s earnings record (appendix Equation A.7). 
SSW is a static measure as it captures the present value of lifetime social 
security benefits at a point in time. As a result, it does not show delayed claiming 
incentives that lead to greater SSW. Researchers have developed a number of forward-
looking measures based on SSW, including a simple one-year accrual, the option value 
approach, and the peak value approach (PKV) (Gruber and Wise 2004). While an 
accrual measure captures growth in the benefit from delaying one year, it does not 
account for further forward-looking incentives two or more years in the future. An option 
value approach improves on this by computing the difference between the utility of 
benefit claiming in the current year relative to the utility maximizing point in the future. 
As Coile and Gruber (2007) note, the calibrated version of the option value approach 
that does not require structural estimation has the majority of the option value measure 
variation explained by individual wages, making identification of a retirement incentive 
harder to argue. The PKV approach of Coile and Gruber (2007) calculates the 
difference between maximum expected value SSW and SSW accrued to date. We use 
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the PKV approach in this paper for ease of comparison across benefit types and across 
countries (all comparison take on a dollar value). 
The peak value, pkvit, for the worker’s own benefits at time t is determined as the 
difference between the greatest SSW achievable from decisions up to time t across all 
possible claiming ages and the SSW at time t: 
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜.𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = � maxk=[t,T] �𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑐𝑐 �𝑝𝑝, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝)��� − 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡))  (2.3) 
Once the peak SSW is achieved, Equation 2.3 takes a value of zero for all future years. 
Given the complexity of the above calculation, we simplify the spouse’s decision for the 
purposes of computing SSW by assuming that the spouse claims as soon as possible.9  
Additional SSW from spousal and survivor benefits peaks at different ages. Thus, 
we cannot use Equation 2.3 to compute the retirement incentives (or disincentives) from 
spousal and survivor benefits. To maintain consistency with the existing literature, which 
has focused on the PKV for own benefits, we study the effects of spousal and survivor 
benefits by looking at the difference between the additional SSW from the spousal 
benefit at year, t, and the own PKV age, p: 
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝.𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑝𝑝, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝)) − 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡))    (2.4) 
for the survivor benefit: 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏.𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑝𝑝, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝)) − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡))   (2.5) 
                                               
9 This is age 62 for own and spousal benefits or age 60 for survivor benefits. If the spouse is 
older than 62, we assume the spouse claims immediately. Not fixing the spouse’s claiming age 
leads to a substantial growth in required computations (i.e., instead of computing benefits for 
all possible ages between 62 and 70 for the primary earner — nine outcomes — we would 
need to compute up to 9x9=81 outcomes). This represents a lower bound for spousal and 
survivor SSW, as delaying claiming may lead to increases in spousal and survivor benefits as 
discussed in Section 2. 
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and for the worker’s supplement: 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝.𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 �𝑝𝑝, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝)� − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 �𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�   (2.6) 
We refer to these as spousal, survivor, and worker’s supplement PKVs for ease of 
exposition, but it is important to remember that they depend on the age of the PKV for a 
worker’s own benefits. 
Our measures of spousal, survivor, and worker’s supplement PKVs are 
potentially negative, capturing the ways in which spousal and survivor benefits 
potentially offset the retirement incentives (disincentives) created by own benefits.  An 
alternative approach would be to create a PKV concept that looked at the PKV for total 
(own, spousal, and survivor) benefits. However, that approach would not be comparable 
to the existing literature and would require an assumption about the value a worker 
places on spousal and survivor benefits relative to his or her own benefits. To the 
degree that past researchers have included spousal and survivor benefits in their SSW 
calculation, they have implicitly assumed that these are treated the same as own 
benefits for the purposes of decision-making. Our findings in this paper suggest that this 
assumption may not be valid. 
For the purposes of the examples and analysis that follow, we assume a real 
discount factor of one, which is equivalent to a zero real discount rate. In recent years, 
the real rate of return on a safe asset (e.g., 10-year treasury bill) has been zero or 
negative. We have also examined higher real rates of return (e.g., 3% real rate of 
return). A higher real rate of return moves the peak value age earlier. At a zero real rate 
of return, own benefits peak value age typically occurs at ages 68 to 69 for men. At a 
3% real rate of return, peak value age occurs around 64 to 66. Moving the peak value 
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age earlier on spousal and survivor benefits tends to make future benefits (e.g., survivor 
benefits) smaller relative to benefits received earlier (e.g., own and spousal benefits), 
and makes all future benefits smaller relative to current income and assets. In our later 
analyses, our findings based on a zero percent real rate of return are generally robust to 
using a 3% real rate of return. 
Auxiliary benefits alter incentives to delay claiming 
Table 2.2 presents an example of SSW from own benefits and additional spousal 
and survivor benefits by age for a U.S. household where the husband, age 60 in 2005, 
receives a $2,000 monthly benefit if he claims at FRA and the wife has no entitlement 
based on her earnings’ history. We assume that additional years of work do not change 
the best 35 years used in his benefit calculation.10 His own SSW at age 62 is $338,700 
and rises to $376,300 if he delays claiming until age 69, leading his PKV to be $37,600 
at age 60 — approximately 11% of his age-62 SSW.11,12 
Table 2.2 also shows the additional SSW from spousal and survivor benefits paid 
to the wife based on the husband’s earnings. If the husband and wife are the same age, 
those auxiliary benefits amount to between 55% and 71% of his own benefit, indicating 
                                               
10 Relaxing this assumption means that his PIA could grow at up to 2.8% (1/35th) per year if the 
additional year of work replaces a zero in his earnings history. Making this adjustment will 
change the values in Table 4.1, but will not alter the general findings.  
11 For women in a similar position, their benefit at age 69 is 17% greater than their age-62 SSW. 
In the U.S., Social Security’s incentives to delay claiming more than offset mortality 
differences. 
12 This means they are not actuarially neutral with an assumed zero real rate of return. The 
assumed real rate of return necessary to make the growth rate in the benefit actuarially neutral 
ranges from 2.2% to 5.1%, and varies by age and gender. Women would require a higher real 
rate of return for the benefit growth rate from delayed claiming to be actuarially neutral. 
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substantial additional wealth for this single-income household.  
Spousal benefits strongly modify incentives to work longer. Whereas own SSW 
increases with time, auxiliary benefits for the same-age couple decline, reflecting the 
loss of spousal benefits for delaying claiming beyond age 62. This results from the 
constraint that a spouse cannot begin to collect spousal benefits until the husband 
claims his own benefit. Consequently, the loss of this additional income is not fully 
replaced by higher benefits from delayed claiming. After age 66, the decline in 
additional spousal SSW is offset by an increase in additional survivor SSW, because 
delayed retirement credits are passed on to the survivor.  
Table 2.2 parses additional SSW from spousal and survivor benefits. In this case, 
the SSW from spousal benefits is greatest at age 62. By age 69, spousal benefits have 
declined by $49,600 (Equation 2.4), erasing the gains in SSW from delayed claiming of 
own benefits and providing a net SSW decrease from delayed claiming. However, the 
increase in survivor benefits from delayed claiming to age 69 is $16,500 (Equation 2.5). 
Combining the own benefit PKV and the difference in additional SSW from spousal and 
survivor benefits at these ages, the value is only a net increase of $4,600, resulting in a 
relatively small incentive for this husband to delay claiming until age 69.  
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Table 2.2: Example of own and auxiliary social security wealth by age (U.S.) 
Characteristics SSW at 62 
SSW at 
69 PKV 
SSW from benefits paid to 
husband    
From own benefits $338,654 $376,277 $37,623 
Additional SSW from benefits paid 
to wife based on the husband’s 
earnings     
From spousal benefits $123,835 $74,274 -$49,561 
From survivor benefits $115,747 $132,243 $16,496 
Subtotal $239,582 $206,517 -$33,065 
    
Combined SSW $578,236 $582,794 $4,558 
Notes: Hypothetical example based on future claiming decisions of a household where the 
husband is age 60 in 2005 and has an earnings history entitling him to a $2,000 monthly benefit 
at his FRA (age 66) and where his wife has no entitlement based on her own earnings history. 
Inflation is assumed to reflect CPI-W through 2020 and remain constant at this value beyond 
2020 (1.3%). The real discount factor is assumed to be one (i.e., no real discounting). Mortality 
rates are based on age and gender and reflect cohort mortality rates through 2018, and then 
assume 2018 period life table rates beyond 2018. 
In Figure 1, we consider the dynamics of SSW accumulation from delayed 
claiming and the consequences of age differences between the husband and wife for 
additional SSW from auxiliary benefits, assuming that the wife has no own pension. Age 
differences have two major effects. First, the younger the spouse, the longer they will 
receive auxiliary benefits, leading to a level shift in additional SSW from auxiliary 
benefits. Second, a younger spouse means that some policy rules on auxiliary benefit 
claiming do not impede their receipt of benefits. For example, we see that a couple in 
which the nonworking spouse is five or 10 years younger has SSW that is largely stable 
through age 66 (the husband’s FRA) and then grows. In this case, the age difference 
enables the spouse to have more years where she collects the spousal benefit after the 
husband has claimed his own benefit (e.g., if the husband claims at 67 or younger, then 
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a five-year younger spouse can claim at her EEA of 62, or he claims at 68, she can 
claim at 63). A younger spouse having limited entitlement on her own earnings history 
enables the couple to receive additional survivor SSW for delaying benefits after FRA, 
but also enables the spouse to collect the spousal benefit for a longer period while he is 
alive, increasing SSW from the spousal benefit.  
Figure 1: Example of own and auxiliary social security wealth by couple’s age 
difference (U.S.) 
 
Notes: Hypothetical example based on future claiming decisions of a household where the 
husband is age 60 in 2005 and has an earnings history where he would be entitled to a $2,000 
monthly benefit at his FRA (age 66) and where his wife has no entitlement based on her own 
earnings history. Inflation is assumed to reflect CPI-W through 2020 and remain constant at this 
value beyond 2020 (1.3%). The real discount factor is assumed to be one (i.e., no real 
discounting). Mortality rates are based on age and gender and reflect cohort mortality rates 




























SSW of husband's own benefit
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Computing the exercise in Table 2.2 for the remaining cases in Figure 1, a 
couple in which the wife is five or 10 years younger has a combined PKV of own and 
auxiliary benefits of $52,000 and $82,000, respectively. The higher values represent the 
additional incentive to delay claiming from the survivor benefit and the insensitivity of 
the spousal benefit. Alternatively, if the wife is older, the combined PKV is -$3,000, 
owing to diminished spousal and survivor benefits at this claiming age. An alternative 
PKV age could be computed based on the combined own, spousal, and survivor 
benefits, which in this case would be age 62.13 
Table 2.2 presents the extreme case of a single-income household where the 
husband is the primary earner. Following a similar setup, Table 2.3 examines changes 
in SSW and PKV based on the spouse’s benefit entitlement relative to a fixed benefit 
entitlement for the husband. Table 2.3a presents a husband’s SSW, at age 62, from 
own benefits, and additional SSW from spousal and survivor benefits. Table 2.3b 
presents the change in the SSW between ages 62 and 69, the PKV age for the 
husband’s own benefits when his wife has no entitlement on her own earnings history. 
These examples assume the husband and wife are the same age. As in Table 2.2, if the 
wife has no benefit entitlement (second column), then additional SSW from spousal and 
survivor benefits amounts to 71% of his own benefits at age 62 ($239,600 relative to 
$338,700). As the spouse’s benefit entitlement based on her own earnings increases, 
the additional SSW from spousal and survivor benefits decreases from $239,600 to 
                                               
13 For the cases where the wife was the same age or five years younger, the combined PKV is 
still achieved at age 69. For the case where the wife was 10 years younger, age 70 
corresponds to the combined PKV. 
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almost zero dollars.14 If her entitlement is half of his entitlement, she is no longer able to 
collect spousal benefits based on his earnings history. However, if he delays claiming 
and she claims as soon as possible, then she would be entitled to survivor benefits that 
are greater than her own benefit based on (1) his full benefit if he dies before his 
claiming age, or (2) his delayed retirement credits. Consequently, a household where 
both members of the couple have the same entitlement at FRA will have some 
additional SSW from the survivor benefit based on differences in claiming age. The 
additional PKV from survivor benefits in the cases where the wife’s income is half or the 
same is $18,300 to $19,900, further increasing the incentive to delay claiming.  
Table 2.3 also presents the case where the wife’s benefit entitlement is twice the 
husband’s. This causes the spousal and survivor benefits to be zero based on the 
husband’s earnings history. However, his wife’s spousal and survivor benefit now affect 
his own SSW, as demonstrated by the “worker’s supplement” rows in Table 2.3. In this 
case, the additional survivor benefits from his wife’s earnings history make his own 
SSW prior to age 70 greater. As a result, his own SSW declines with age, so his PKV is 
achieved at age 62. We expect a PKV at age-62 for individuals whose benefit 
entitlement is one-half or less of their spouse’s entitlement.  
                                               
14 This slight benefit amount corresponds to the rare possibility that the husband would die 
before 62 and the survivor would be entitled to benefit payments at ages 60 to 61. 
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Table 2.3: Example of own and auxiliary social security wealth by age (U.S.) 
a. Social security wealth at age 62 
Characteristics 
Wife’s Benefit Entitlement Relative to 
Husband’s 
None Half Equal Double 
SSW from benefits paid to husband     
  From worker's own benefits $338,654 $338,654 $338,654 $338,654 
  From worker’s supplement  $0 $0 $0 $67,193 
  Subtotal  $338,654 $338,654 $338,654 $405,247 
Additional SSW from benefits paid to 
wife based on husband’s earnings      
  From spousal benefits $123,835 $0 $0 $0 
  From survivor benefits $115,747 $55,042 $2 $2 
  Subtotal $239,582 $55,042 $2 $2 
     
Combined SSW from Own and  
Auxiliary Benefits $578,236 $393,696 $338,656 $405,249 
 
b. Difference between social security wealth at age 62 and at age 69 
(Age 69 is peak value age when spouse’s benefit is less than worker’s benefit) 
Notes: Hypothetical example based on future claiming decisions of a household where the husband 
and wife are age 60 in 2005 and the husband has an earnings history where he would be entitled to a 
$2,000 monthly benefit at his FRA (age 66) and where his wife’s benefit entitlement varies. Inflation is 
assumed to reflect CPI-W through 2020 and remain constant at this value beyond 2020 (1.3%). The 
real discount factor is assumed to be one (i.e., no real discounting). Mortality rates are based on age 
and gender and reflect cohort mortality rates through 2018, and then assume 2018 period life table 
rates beyond 2018.
Characteristics 
Wife’s benefit entitlement relative to 
husband’s 
None Half Equal Double 
PKV from benefits paid to 
husband    
 
From worker's own benefits $37,623 $37,623 $37,623 $37,623 
From worker’s supplement $0 $0 $0 -$42,523 
Subtotal  $37,623 $37,623 $37,623 -$4,900 
Additional PKV from benefits paid 
to wife based on worker’s 
earnings  
    
From spousal benefits -$49,561 $0 $0 $0 
From survivor benefits $16,496 $19,912 $18,320 $21 
Subtotal -$33,065 $19,912 $18,320 $21 
     
Combined PKV from Own and 
Auxiliary Benefits $4,558 $57,535 $55,943 -$4,880 
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In our analysis in Section 4, we use the measures discussed here to address 
whether incentives from added SSW due to spousal and survivor benefits are related to 
the decision to continue work by incorporating these measures into a model of labor 
force exit. The examples in this section illustrate that additional spousal and survivor 
benefit SSW  can provide significant added incentives (or disincentives) to continue 
work past the EEA, and the value of these incentives depends on the spouses’ age 
differences and differences in benefit entitlement based on their individual earnings 
histories.  Further, spousal and survivor benefits may also incentivize a different 
decision in terms of retirement timing than incentives based on a worker’s own benefit 
alone. 
A worker’s benefit payment in the U.S. depends on a complex interaction of own 
claiming decisions and his or her spouse’s claiming decisions. Our aim is to understand 
whether auxiliary benefits and associated incentives influence retirement decisions. If 
we find that workers respond more to the value of their own benefit entitlement then to 
the value of benefits paid to their spouse, then it could indicate that workers place less 
value on spousal benefits, or it could simply indicate that they do not understand 
spousal benefits. Looking just at the U.S. would not enable us to understand the role of 
the system’s complexity. To provide a benchmark, we compare results for Germany, 
where survivor benefits create similar incentives for retirement timing. In Germany, as 
we discuss next, survivor benefits are largely independent of the survivor’s decision, 
making the benefit calculation, and resulting incentives, easier to understand. 
C. Institutional details of Germany 
GRV is the mandatory state pension system in Germany. Whereas OASDI 
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remains funded through current and past contributions, the public pension in Germany 
shifted to pay-as-you-go in 1959, meaning current contributions pay for the benefits of 
current beneficiaries. Like OASDI, GRV provides benefits for the elderly, widows, and 
the disabled. The social security systems of the Federal Republic of Germany (i.e., 
West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (i.e., East Germany) were 
merged in 1992. Since then, a number of reforms have aimed to improve the long-term 
viability of the system, including the introduction of increases in EEA (1999), FRA (1999, 
2007), new benefit adjustments and changes to survivor benefits (2001), and the 
introduction of contribution and sustainability factors in determining benefit levels 
(2004).  
We focus on two major benefits of GRV: own retirement benefits and survivor 
retirement benefits.15 Similar to the U.S., we exclude disability benefits. Spousal 
benefits similar to those in OASDI do not exist in Germany.16 GRV also does not have 
the range of other auxiliary benefits available in OASDI. GRV does offer different benefit 
eligibility rules for miners, but we do not account for this distinction in our analysis.  
Contributions to GRV vary by year. Since 2018, contributions have been 9.3% of 
wage income (employers provide an equal amount), up to a statutory maximum that 
                                               
15 In GRV, there are major and minor survivor benefits. The minor survivor benefits refer to a 
benefit received in the 24 months following death. Major benefits are persistent benefits 
received after meeting EEA. When referring to “retirement benefits” in the case of GRV, we 
are referring to the major survivor benefit. 
16 Since 2001, spouses are permitted to split their pensions, but this is not required and splitting 
pensions eliminates entitlement to survivor benefits. Additionally, the federal government 
began offering the Riester pension, a tax-advantaged saving account where the government 
will make subsidized contributions up to 350 euros per couple per year. These values are 
substantially smaller compared to GRV old age and survivor benefits. 
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differs by region (set at  78,000 euros in 2018 in West Germany and 69,600 euros in 
East Germany). Male workers are entitled to start receiving their own retirement benefits 
at an EEA of 63 if they reached that age prior to 2018. Male workers with at least 35 
years of contributions have a FRA of 65 years if reaching FRA before 2012. FRA is 
lowered to the EEA for workers with at least 45 years of contributions. Men and women 
used to have differing eligibility ages, although these differences are legislated to 
disappear in the next decade. Female workers had an FRA of 60, making the effective 
EEA also 60 before 2006. The FRA rose by one year annually until it matched the male 
FRA of 65 in 2010.  For survivor benefits, the EEA is 45 for individuals qualifying before 
2012. For survivor benefits, the EEA and FRA are the same (i.e., there is no incentive to 
delay receiving benefits). The FRA and EEA for own and survivor benefits are 
scheduled to increase through 2029. Appendix Table B.2 details differences in EEA and 
FRA by birth year and sex. 
The GRV monthly benefit amount is straightforward to compute. It is determined 
by multiplying the pension point value by an individual’s accumulated number of 
pension points. For consistency, we refer to this as the German PIA. Annual pension 
points are computed based on the ratio of individual earnings (up to the maximum 
allowable) in that year to the national average earnings of all contributors (differentiated 
by East and West Germany). An individual can earn up to two pension points per year. 
In 2020, the pension point value was 33.23 euros for East Germany and 34.19 euros for 
West Germany. This means that an individual who earned an average wage and 
worked 40 years would have 40 pension points and be entitled to 16,411 euros a year in 
West Germany (approx. $19,690 if the conversion rate is $1.2 per euro). For survivor 
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benefits, the survivor receives 55% of the deceased’s own benefit (60% if born before 
1962 and married before 2002).  
As in the U.S., own benefits are reduced if receipt starts before FRA and 
increased if receipt starts after FRA. These increments do not depend on birth year. 
Table 2.4 demonstrates the fraction of the German PIA a male worker would be eligible 
to receive by age. If a worker dies before starting his or her own retirement benefit, then 
the survivor is entitled to 55% of the deceased’s PIA. If a worker dies after starting his or 
her own retirement benefit, then the survivor is entitled to 55% of the benefit level they 
were eligible to receive based on when the deceased started benefits. Table 2.4 depicts 
the case of benefit reductions based on the deceased’s claiming age. The survivor’s 
claiming age does not matter.  
Table 2.4: GRV benefit amounts based on percent of male worker PIA  


















45-62   55%  
63 92.8% 92.8% 55% 51.0% 
64 96.4% 96.4% 55% 53.0% 
65 (FRA) 100% 100% 55% 55.0% 
66 106% 106% 55% 58.3% 
67 112% 112% 55% 61.6% 
68 118% 118% 55% 64.9% 
69 124% 124% 55% 68.2% 
70+ 130% 130% 55% 71.5% 
Note: Values reflect rules for a male worker who becomes age eligible after 2001 with a FRA of 
age 65. Ages 45 to 47 are the EEA for survivor benefits depending on year of eligibility. Age 63 
is the EEA for own benefits. Survivor benefits are reduced based on the deceased’s claiming 
behavior.  (1) Combined survivor benefits as presented assume deceased and survivor claimed 
at same age and that the deceased claimed prior to death. If the deceased does not claim his or 
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her benefits before death, then the own benefit reflects 100% PIA plus any credits for delaying 
retirement past FRA. 
The pension point rate is updated annually to account for changes in the average 
wage, acting as a cost-of-living adjustment. Since 2004, this adjustment also accounts 
for a contribution factor which reflects changes in the contributions to the fund and a 
sustainability factor that accounts for shifts in the dependency ratio (the ratio of 
pensioners to contributors).17 The goal of these adjustments is to make benefit growth 
more reflective of changes to GRV’s funding base. These changes are generally small. 
In 2020, the contributory factor was 1 (no adjustment for contributions, since the rate 
was held steady) and the sustainability factory was 1.0017 since the number of 
pensioners decreased relative to contributors. 
Mathematically, a German worker i’s own benefit at time t, like a U.S. worker’s 
benefit,  is determined by the worker’s claiming age, birth year, a vector of lifetime 
earnings accrued through period 𝑡𝑡. In Germany, it is also depended on whether they are 
from East or West Germany:  
  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠,𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) × 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜.𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠,𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)   (2.7) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(⋅) corresponds to the pension point value in year 𝑠𝑠 depending on whether 
respondent i lives in East or West Germany (as indicated by 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖), which is updated 
annually by GRV, based on the average wage growth and sustainability adjustment, 
                                               
17 “If the number of pensioners increases faster than the number of contributors, this has a 
dampening effect on the pension adjustment. In the opposite case, the sustainability factor 




𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜.𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(⋅) is the multiplier on the benefit entitlement reflecting changes from 
claiming own benefits before or after the FRA (see “Worker Claiming Age Reduction 
Factor” in Table 2.4 for an example, Appendix Table B.1 for reductions in benefit by 
claim age relative to FRA). Finally, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(⋅) reflects the worker i’s cumulative pension 
points based on his lifecycle earnings accrued through period 𝑠𝑠 and accounting whether 
respondent i lives in East or West Germany. Appendix A provides further detail on the 
computation of German survivor benefits. 
Importantly, unlike in the U.S., there is no additional interrelationship of 
household claiming behavior in GRV beyond those built into the reductions in survivor 
benefits if the deceased begins receiving benefits before FRA. There is no spousal 
benefit and a survivor can collect both a survivor benefit based on a deceased’s 
pension points and their own benefit based on their own pension points. A dually 
entitled survivor (i.e., entitled to their own and a survivor benefit) may have their survivor 
benefit reduced based on an income test that includes own pension income.  
D. Previous literature 
Effective retirement ages for men declined while life expectancy improved 
strongly in many countries in the last quarter of the 20th century. Seminal work of 
Gruber and Wise (1999), provided comprehensive evidence about the role of pension 
system incentives  in explaining the decline of labor force participation rates concurrent 
with longer life expectancy . This work compared financial incentives to retire at different 
ages in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. on the aggregate level. Incentives were 
measured through replacement rates and the changes in SSW when postponing 
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retirement age by a year, the so-called implicit tax on work. The subsequent work on 
similar countries (Gruber and Wise 2004) enforced the previous conclusions with new 
evidence based on microdata. Their SSW measures combined own pension 
entitlements and spousal and survivor benefits.  
In the past decade, researchers have begun to study survivor pensions and other 
benefits that do not depend on own earnings history but on the earnings history of 
spouses or partners, also known as derived pension rights. James (2009) presented an 
international landscape of survivor pensions while the OECD (2018) updated and 
broadened this picture through depicting the main features of survivor pensions in the 
OECD countries. Almost all OECD countries cover survivor risks, but the design and 
generosity of spousal and survivor benefits differ greatly across countries. Survivor 
schemes were generally tightened over the last decades. 
In the last few years, researchers have studied the couples’ financial incentives 
embedded in derived pension rights and begun to evaluate their role on employment 
decisions. Coile (2004) demonstrates that a wife’s pension incentives (as measured by 
a spouse’s own PKV) influence her husband’s work decision, but finds limited evidence 
of the reverse. Coile (2018) provides an updated picture of the U.S.’ financial incentives 
to retire, including derived pension rights and private pensions. In particular, they show 
how a spouse’s income affects the implicit tax on working longer and argue that women 
often face different retirement incentives than men. For Belgium, Jousten and Lefebvre 
(2019) showed that spousal and survivor benefits substantially modify the incentives for 
retiring, which mainly affect women’s employment decisions. For Germany, Börsch-
Supan, Rausch and Goll (2020) showed that couples’ SSW is larger than the sum of 
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individuals when the survivor benefit is included.  
The role of spousal and survivor benefits on female labor supply has been shown 
to be particularly important. Nishiyama (2019), who focuses on the redistributive 
mechanism between singles to couples within pension systems, provides evidence that 
survivor and spousal benefits reduce female labor market participation by around 1.5% 
in the U.S. Similarly, Borella, De Nardi, and Yang, (2019) found that eliminating U.S. 
spousal and survivor benefits would substantially increase married women’s labor 
market participation.  
The interaction between employment decisions and derived pension rights has 
received substantial research interest, catching up with the evidence gathered for own 
pension benefits and employment decisions. Yet none of the studies to date have 
questioned whether a worker treats their own benefits the same as spousal and survivor 
benefits. Implicitly, they assume that workers respond similarly to an additional $1 from 
their own benefit versus $1 from auxiliary benefits. Our findings are consistent with this 
not being true. 
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3. Data and summary statistics 
A. Panel data 
We use the harmonized data files developed by the Gateway to Global Aging 
Data (g2aging.org), an NIH-funded data and information portal.18 These harmonized 
data files are designed for cross-country analysis using the international family of Health 
and Retirement Studies. The first of these studies was the U.S.’ Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS), started in 1992 as a nationally-representative panel study of people older 
than 50  and their spouses. The HRS has been conducted biennially since its start and 
has added additional cohorts every six years.  
Since 2001, a growing number of sister studies have been started around the 
world, which are purposefully designed to be comparable to the HRS. One such study is 
the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which began its first 
wave in 2004. Like the HRS, SHARE has (1) biennial interviews with respondents and 
their spouses; (2) a multidisciplinary questionnaire design that elicits a wealth of 
information about health, retirement, demographics, and other topics; and (3) regular 
refreshment samples to keep the sample representative of the older population. 
However, SHARE administered a life-history interview for Wave 3 instead of core 
interviews. There is a four-year core interview interval between 2007 and 2011. 
We use data from the HRS and SHARE to study how retirement claiming 
decisions of married households in the U.S. and Germany are influenced by the 
                                               
18 Gateway to Global Aging Data (2020), produced by the Program on Global Aging, Health & 
Policy, University of Southern California, with funding from the National Institute on Aging (R01 
AG030153) 
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existence and structure of auxiliary benefits.19 
B. Sample selection 
To ensure common observational periods for HRS and SHARE, we begin our 
sample in 2004 and follow both biannually through 2016. This corresponds to a 
maximum of six observations for HRS and five observations for Germany.20 Since our 
interest is in married households’ retirement incentives, we apply a series of sample 
restriction noted in Table 3.1.   
  
                                               
19 The HRS (2020) is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging (grant number NIA 
U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan. The data used in this analysis 
is partly derived from RAND HRS Longitudinal File 2016 (V2) (2020). This paper also uses 
data from SHARE Waves 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 (DOIs: 10.6103/SHARE.w1.710, 
10.6103/SHARE.w2.710, 10.6103/SHARE.w3.710, 10.6103/SHARE.w4.710, 
10.6103/SHARE.w5.710, 10.6103/SHARE.w6.710, 10.6103/SHARE.w7.711, 
10.6103/SHARE.w8cabeta.001), see Börsch-Supan et al. (2013) for methodological details. 
The SHARE data collection has been funded by the European Commission through FP5 
(QLK6-CT-2001-00360), FP6 (SHARE-I3: RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE: CIT5-CT-2005-
028857, SHARELIFE: CIT4-CT-2006-028812), FP7 (SHARE-PREP: GA N°211909, SHARE-
LEAP: GA N°227822, SHARE M4: GA N°261982, DASISH: GA N°283646) and Horizon 2020 
(SHARE-DEV3: GA N°676536, SHARE-COHESION: GA N°870628, SERISS: GA N°654221, 
SSHOC: GA N°823782) and by DG Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion. Additional funding 
from the German Ministry of Education and Research, the Max Planck Society for the 
Advancement of Science, the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01_AG09740-13S2, 
P01_AG005842, P01_AG08291, P30_AG12815, R21_AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, 
IAG_BSR06-11, OGHA_04-064, HHSN271201300071C) and from various national funding 
sources is gratefully acknowledged(see www.share-project.org). Additionally, this paper uses 
data from the generated Job Episodes Panel (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.jep.710), see Brugiavini 
et al. (2019) for methodological details. The Job Episodes Panel release 7.1.0 is based on  
SHARE Waves 3 and 7 (DOIs: 10.6103/SHARE.w3.710, 10.6103/SHARE.w7.710). 
20 Observations require consecutive interviews in order to determine an exit, meaning that we 
must observe an individual working in wave t and observe whether they are working or not 
working in t+1. Therefore, despite there being seven interviews between 2004 and 2016 for 
the HRS, we have a maximum of six observations. 
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Table 3.1: Sample size after adjusting for inclusion criteria 
Sample Restrictions HRS Sample (USA) 
SHARE Sample 
(Germany) 
 Persons Person- Year Persons 
Person- 
Year 
Respondents in 2004 20,129 138,062 2,995 18,241 
Restrict to respondents whose 
birth year is 1943 to 1954 
5,832 42,798 1,217 7,414 
Respondents working in 2004 4,143 24,920 809 2,307 
Respondents married in 2004 2,958 17,869 645 1,872 
Continuous interview history2 2,723 16,813 363 1,459 
Drop interviews after first 
observed instance of leaving 
labor force 
2,723 10,717 363 884 
     
Final Sample 2,723 10,717 363 884 
Men 1,363 5,492 181 431 
Women 1,360 5,225 182 453 
Note: (1) Pension benefits are computed for individuals observed working for pay during the 
course of any surveys in the respective studies. (2) Continuous interview history means that 
observations after any gap in interviews is dropped from our analysis. It also drops individuals 
with only one interview wave. 
The first and largest sample reduction is due to the initial age condition, which 
requires that the respondent be younger than 62 when first observed. Age 62 is chosen 
because it is the EEA in the U.S. and we are interested in observing behavioral 
responses once individuals are eligible to claim benefits. Similarly, the second and third 
sample reductions reflect our focus on different-sex married individuals for whom 
retiring (i.e., withdrawing from the labor force) is possible.21 The fourth sample reduction 
is to require a continuous interview history, which is necessary to identify exit from the 
labor force. We require the follow-up period to be the next possible interview, which 
further eliminates individuals who skipped the 2006 survey (i.e., the first interview 
                                               
21 We exclude households with same-sex marriages for this analysis because they were not 
eligible for Social Security auxiliary benefits during the evaluation period. 
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following the 2004 survey). This results in 8% reduction in respondents for the U.S. and 
a 44% reduction in respondents for Germany respectively, a reduction of 6% and 22% 
of person-year observations. Finally, we drop observations after the first exit from the 
labor force, since our interest is in the relationship between first exit from the labor force 
and pension incentives. 
Given Germany’s large reduction in the sample at the fourth step , in Appendix D, 
we investigate the characteristics of those households in the U.S. and Germany that 
respond in 2004 but not in 2006. For Germany, to the degree that our pension 
measures are associated with active attrition, the pattern suggests that those entitled to 
greater SSW and with less incentive to delay claiming based on their own benefit are 
more likely to attrit.  
C. Sample summary statistics 
Table 3.2 reports characteristics of our married household sample. By virtue of 
the sample selection, all our sample respondents are married and working in 2004. Both 
samples have an average age around 54 to 55, with the average Germany man being 
the same age and the average German woman being 0.5 years younger. In both 
countries, working men are older than their wives on average, 2.4 years in the U.S. and 
2.3 years in Germany. Given this, it is unsurprising that working women tend to be 
younger than their husbands, but the age gap is larger, 3.1 in the U.S. and 2.8 in 
Germany. The larger gap for married, working women suggests that, on average, they 
are married to older husbands than nonworking, married women. Men and women in 
Germany have longer marriages on average (3.4 to 3.7 years), but spouses are notably 
less likely to be working, 9% for wives of working men, 8% for husbands of working 
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women. This suggests a lower prevalence of dual-earner couples in Germany. Part of 
this difference may reflect the German data’s greater spousal nonresponse, which is 
19% for wives of working men and 26% for husbands of working women, compared to 
2% of either in the HRS.22 
We see interesting differences across genders and countries in household labor 
force participation. In the U.S., a working, married woman earns 51% of a working, 
married man, but the wife of a working man earns 64% of the husband of a working 
woman. This indicates that the gender wage gap for married households in this age 
group is smaller for dual-income households and that households depending on the wife 
to be the sole income earn notably less than households that depend on the husband 
for the sole income. In Germany, a working, married woman earns 47% of a working, 
married man, but an employed wife of a working man earns 43% of an employed 
husband of a working woman. These comparisons do not account for difference in work 
effort (i.e., German women are more likely to work part-time, leading to lower incomes). 
Comparing German to U.S. incomes for this age group, we see that working, married 
men in Germany earn 64% of their U.S. counterparts and working, married women earn 
59%.23 Wives of working husbands in Germany earn 56% of their U.S. counterparts and 
husbands of working wives earn 83%. This last finding suggests that the fewer German 
husbands of working wives who are themselves working for pay are positively selected: 
                                               
22 Wave 1 SHARE did not recruit non age-qualifying spouses and started recruiting spouses 
younger than age 50 from Wave 2 forward. 
23 This comparison is sensitive to the assumed exchange rate. For comparison purposes, we 
use a $1.24 per euro exchange rate, which is the average rate in 2004 
(https://www.macrotrends.net/2548/euro-dollar-exchange-rate-historical-chart). Also note, that 
incomes reflect self-reported pre-tax amounts. 
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They tend to earn relatively more than working men overall. Their U.S. counterparts are 
negatively selected: They tend to earn less than married and working U.S. men.   
Reflecting the gender education gap for this birth cohort, a greater proportion of 
working men holds a college degree than working women, both in the U.S. (38% versus 
30%) and Germany (43% versus 34%), and that proportion is higher for both men and 
women in Germany than the U.S. The proportion of college educated was equivalent for 
working women and wives of working men, but a smaller proportion of husbands of 
working women are college educated compared with working men in both U.S. and 
Germany. For example, in the U.S., 33% of husbands of working women have college 
degrees compared with 38% of working men. Similarly in Germany, 36% of husbands of 
working women have college degrees compared with 43% of working men.  
Note that a greater proportion of German women hold physically demanding jobs 
(27%) than German men (19%) or American men (18%) and women (17%). In both 
countries, working women reported higher survival probabilities than working men, 69% 
versus 64% in the U.S. and 72.4% versus 69% in Germany. In Germany, missingness 
is an issue for both the respondent’s and spouse’s subjective survival probabilities. For 
German spouses, missingness can stem from not only the spouse not providing the 
response to survival probability question, but also the spouse not participating in the 
interview.  
Home ownership is much higher in the U.S. than Germany with more than 90% 
of American workers owning their home and home ownership about 16 to 21 
percentage points lower in Germany. With regard to household assets, households with 
working, married women have about 5% less than households with working, married 
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men in the U.S..  In Germany, a 10% household asset difference is observed.  
In the U.S., SSW for women is 92% of men’s SSW, reflecting greater relative 
earnings for men compared to women – the main determinant of SSW (see Equation 
2.1). The comparatively small difference between SSW of U.S, working women and 
men may reflect the progressivity of the pension benefit and women’s longer life 
expectancy. It also partly reflects our relatively strong assumptions for projecting 
earnings history based on last observed earnings.24 In Germany, SSW for women is 
75% of men’s SSW. The lower relative SSW for women is consistent with lower relative 
incomes. As discussed in the last section, PKV represents the growth in SSW from 
delaying benefit claiming to a later age when SSW is maximized. That age varies by 
gender. As such, the PKV is 9% greater for U.S. women in our sample at baseline and 
3% greater for German women. In the U.S., average PKV is 19% to 22% of own SSW, 
while this ratio is 30% to 40% in Germany. The greater growth from continued work and 
delayed claiming in Germany reflects that accrual of additional pension points is not 
limited, so additional years of contributions lead to benefit growth on top of any benefit 
increments for delayed claiming. The U.S. uses the best 35 years of earnings for 
computing benefits, limiting the benefit gains from additional years of contribution to 
only replacing the worst earnings years. 
                                               
24 We discuss our approach to predicting earnings histories in Appendix A. We considered a 
variety of alternative approaches to projected earnings history in lieu of administrative data on 
earnings history. Alternative approaches considering select-reported years worked can make 
this difference more pronounced. However, as discussed in Knapp et al. (2019), approaches 
using self-reported years worked introduce additional, more substantive error than our 
comparatively simpler approach. Regardless, our results are robust to the alternative 
approaches discussed in Knapp et al. (2019) that do not use administrative data. 
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Additional SSW from spousal and survivor benefits depends on the spouses’ age 
difference and the spouse’s own benefit entitlement. Working men have greater 
additional SSW from spousal and survivor benefits, but the difference is likely being 
driven by working men earning more than working women. For spousal and survivor 
PKV, the gender differences are substantial. In the U.S., working men have an 
additional incentive of $28,800 from survivor benefits to continue working to their peak 
value age, which is 49% of the PKV from their own benefit. The spousal benefit 
disincentivizes continued work until the peak value age, reducing the net incentive to 
delay claiming by $16,900, or 29% of the PKV from their own benefit. This net effect 
from additional spousal and survivor benefits is equivalent to 20% of the PKV from their 
own benefit, providing the average married, working man a financial incentive to delay 
claiming. For working women, this is -4%, because the spousal benefit provides a 
disincentive to work to their own PKV age. The differences reflect working women’s 
husbands being more likely to be eligible for their own benefits than working husbands’ 
wives.  
A worker’s supplemental SSW tends to be small for working, married men (3% of 
own SSW) and comparatively larger for working, married women (19% of own SSW). 
The larger value for women reflects their greater likelihood of receiving these benefits. A 
similar pattern exists in Germany, except these benefits are comparatively more 
valuable (53% of own SSW) due in part to lower SSW but larger expected benefits 
since the survivor benefit can start as early as age 45 in Germany and is additive to own 
benefits. The reported means mask substantial variation, which can be observed by 
looking at the standard deviation. The standard deviation in SSW and PKV from spousal 
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and survivor benefits typically exceed the mean values, likely reflecting many zero 
values.  
Table 3.2: Summary statistics in 2004 
Characteristics HRS Sample SHARE Sample 
 Men Women Men Women 
Married (%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Age (mean) 55.0 54.9 55.0 54.4 
Age difference with spouse 
(mean) 1 2.4 -3.1 2.3 -2.8 
Length of current marriage 
(mean) 25.1 26.5 28.5 30.2 
Working for pay (%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Spouse working for pay (%)1 73% 77% 64% 69% 
Non-responsive spouse 2% 2% 19% 26% 
Earnings (if working, mean) $98,254 $50,597 €50,953 €24,120 
Spousal earnings (if working, 
mean) $56,763 $88,857 €25,676 €59,171 
Education: College degree + 
(%) 38% 30% 43% 34% 
Sp. Educ: College degree + 
(%)1 29% 33% 34% 36% 
Has physically demanding job 
(%) 18% 17% 19% 27% 
Self-reported probability of 
survival to 75 (mean) 62.9 68.5 69.4 73.0 
Missing data (%) 16% 6% 1% 1% 
Spouse’s self-reported 
probability of survival to 75 
(mean) 68.0 63.0 70.9 75.9 
Missing data (%) 9% 26% 19% 30% 
Own house (%) 91% 93% 75% 72% 
Household assets (mean) $649,312 $620,018 €480,052 €429,796 
Own SSW and PKV     
SSW of own benefit $317,238 $293,212 €240,156 €179,583 ($112,418) ($138,945) (€157,359) (€137,369) 
PKV of own benefit $58,806 $64,009 €71,290 €73,092 ($26,595) ($36,254) (€51,526) (€61,304) 
Missing sp/surv data (%) 0% 0% 2% 8% 
Auxiliary SSW and PKV     
SSW of spousal benefit $31,036 $13,506   ($42,562) ($27,038)   
PKV of spousal benefit -$16,865 -$10,803   ($18,908) ($17,693)   
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SSW survivor benefit $48,503 $5,492 €77,100 €12,373 ($59,321) ($13,682) (€50,331) (€13,181) 
PKV survivor benefit $28,820 $8,058 €52,164 €11,665 ($22,684) ($11,049) (€36,453) (€10,253) 
SSW supplement from spouse $9,734 $56,768 €12,689 €95,739 ($28,655) ($70,677) (€13,989) (€54,151) 
PKV supplement from spouse -$5,083 -$31,044 -€6,412 -€29,603 ($10,950) ($34,480) (€7,894) (€24,281) 
Missing spousal data (%) 11% 7% 40%
2 50%2 
    
Final Sample 1,363 1,360 181 182 
Note: Summary statistics based on unweighted samples. Standard deviation of select variables 
in parentheses. All values indexed to 2019 values using OECD’s consumer price index (OECD, 
2021). (1) Spousal variables are conditional on the spouse responding to the survey.(2) There 
are high rates of missing data in SHARE because many spouses are not interviewed. Of the 
spouses interviewed, many are missing reported income preventing us from estimating survivor 
SSW. For these individuals, we treat SSW and PKV as missing when reporting values. 
Table 3.3 reports summary statistics of our panel data. Among our sample of 
married U.S. workers, labor force participation rates among men were 82% at ages 60 
to 61 and 52% at ages 65 to 66. For women, a similar pattern is observed, albeit at 
lower levels. A different pattern is observed for the Germany.  Compared to U.S. 
workers, a greater proportion of German workers stay in labor force at ages 60 to 61, 
but labor force participation rate sharply drops at ages 65 to 66, reaching 41% for men 
and 29% for women. In Germany, a large gender gap exists in full-time work (defined as 
35 or more hours worked per week, 36 or more weeks worked per year), with the 
majority of German women working less than full-time. In the U.S., the gender gap is 
also large in full-time work, but the gap diminishes at older ages. For example, at ages 
60 to 61, 68% of men are working full-time compared with 50% of women. At ages 65 to 
66, that rate goes down to 34% for men and 22% for women, and by ages 69 to 70 (not 
shown), the rate differs by only 6 percentage points (18% for men and 12% for women).  
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With regard to marital status, we observe that more than 90% of men are married 
to their original spouse at ages 65 to 66 both in the U.S. and Germany. For women in 
that age group the rate is 84%. Changes in marriage are driven by a mixture of 
widowhood and divorce, with widowhood becoming increasingly more important with 
age. Higher widowhood rates for women are reflective of higher mortality among men 
than women: About 10% of women at ages 65 to 66 experience widowhood in both 
countries, and this rate roughly doubles at ages 69 to 70 (not shown). 
Similar to what we observed in the first period of observation (Table 3.2), SSW 
for women is typically around 90% of men’s SSW, and both sexes exhibit a similar 
increase in SSW between ages 60 to 61 and ages 65 to 66. For Germany, own SSW for 
women is 75% of men’s own SSW at ages 60 to 61, and this gap widens with age. In 
both countries, own PKV declines with age. Additional SSW from spousal benefits 
decreases slightly with age, and the fraction eligible for men decreases from 78% at 
ages 60 to 61 to 43% at ages 65 to 66. Less than a quarter of women are eligible for 
spousal benefits reflecting the comparatively higher incomes of their husbands. PKV 
from spousal benefits is negative, -$14,000 at ages 60 to 61, reflecting a strong 
disincentive on average to delay benefit claiming to the peak value age of one’s own 
benefits. This disincentive decreases with age. Survivor SSW increases with age in both 
countries. For women in both countries, additional SSW from the survivor benefit is 
comparatively small, and also increases with age. At ages 60 to 61, 91% of married, 
working men have some additional SSW from the survivor benefit, but this declines with 
age. That pattern likely reflects that, if his wife continues to work, the value of the 
survivor benefit is reduced and potentially eliminated as the wife’s own benefit 
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increases. For Germany, the values are comparatively higher as their survivor benefits 
are additive, only being reduced or eliminated due to an income test. PKV for survivor 
benefits declines for both men and women with age, although the average value tends 
to be larger for men, reflecting greater earnings and benefit levels.   
Table 3.3: Summary statistics at key age groups in all survey years 
Characteristics HRS Sample SHARE Sample 
 Husbands Wives Husbands Wives 
Percent currently working     
Age 60-61 82% 76% 91% 84% 
Age 65-66 52% 46% 41% 29% 
 
    
Percent currently working 
full-time1     
Age 60-61 68% 50% 68% 24% 
Age 65-66 34% 22% 15% 2% 
 
    
Percent still married to 
original spouse     
Age 60-61 94% 92% 98% 92% 
Age 65-66 91% 84% 94% 84% 
 
    
Percent widowed2     
Age 60-61 2% 5% 0% 3% 
Age 65-66 4% 11% 3% 10% 
     
Average own SSW      
Age 60-61 $357,728 $318,540 €288,640 €218,891 
Age 65-66 $428,150 $380,198 €331,489 €220,493 
     
Average own PKV     
Age 60-61 $51,854 $66,363 €26,468 €31,431 
Age 65-66 $12,047 $20,472 €5,209 €7,675 
     
Average SSW from spousal 
benefits     
Age 60-61 $28,240 $7,160   
Age 65-66 $24,800 $6,705   
     
Fraction with positive SSW 
from spousal benefits     
Age 60-61 78% 22%   
Age 65-66 43% 13%   
     
Average PKV from spousal 
benefits     
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Age 60-61 -$14,035 -$3,912   
Age 65-66 -$4,300 -$1,825   
     
Average SSW from survivor 
benefits     
Age 60-61 $45,244 $3,921 €81,243 €7,970 
Age 65-66 $67,071 $5,269 €98,187 €8,737 
     
Fraction with positive SSW 
from survivor benefits     
Age 60-61 91% 41% 100% 85% 
Age 65-66 81% 19% 95% 79% 
     
Average PKV from survivor 
benefits     
Age 60-61 $35,229 $11,600 €37,264 €6,442 
Age 65-66 $26,529 $5,588 €11,706 €1,768 
Note: Summary statistics based on unweighted samples. All values indexed to 2019 values 
using OECD’s consumer price index (OECD, 2021). (1) Full-time work is defined as working 35 
or more hours per week, 36 or more weeks per year. For SHARE, weeks worked in the last year 
is not asked after the fifth interview wave, so for subsequent waves, we define full-time based 
on hours only. (2) Widowhood reflects observed transitions from a marital status of married to 
widowed. If a spouse is widowed and remarried between interviews, widowhood is not identified 
using this approach. 
4. Model 
We investigate the husband’s and wife’s decisions to leave the labor force, 
considering the roles of the absolute value of SSW and its relative value compared to 
the maximum potential SSW. The difference between the maximum potential SSW and 
current SSW reflects the incentive to continue work at different ages, the so-called peak 
value. These measures account for age- and gender-specific mortality and pension 
incentives for both members of the couple. We control for individual characteristics 
(e.g., health, perceived probability of surviving to age 75), couple characteristics (e.g., 
spouses’ age difference, whether the wife is currently working), and other observable 
household characteristics (e.g., net assets, home ownership). 
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A. Model of labor force exit 
We are interested in whether a worker’s decision to leave the labor force is 
associated with SSW and the incentives designed into the pension system. Our 
outcome measure is exiting the labor force (recall that our sample is restricted to 
individuals who are in the labor force as of 2004). 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a binary indicator of whether 
or not individual i exits the labor force at period t, no matter whether he or she claims 
pensions. Since our outcome measure is binary, we estimate a probit model.25 Our 
specification is: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = Pr (𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 0)  (4.1) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of i’s own SSW and own PKV, as defined in Equations 2.2 and 2.3. 
𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of i’s SSW and PKV from spousal and survivor benefits paid to the i’s 
spouse and the i’s supplement (as defined in Equations 2.4 - 2.6 and appendix 
Equations A.7 - A.9). 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  represents a respondent’s observable characteristics, including 
his or her age difference with their spouse, marriage length, self-reported poor health, 
educational achievement, self-reported probability of living to 75 reported in 2004, 
whether he or she has retirement plan through his or her employer in 2004 (U.S. only), 
and whether the job they held in 2004 was physically demanding.26,27 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents a 
                                               
25 Alternatively, we could reframe our model of labor force exit in terms of a logit model or a 
linear probability model, which reflect slightly different assumptions pertaining to the error 
distribution and the boundedness of the outcome measure. In practice, using these alternative 
models changes point estimates of the marginal effects of factors but does not meaningfully 
alter the substantive findings we discuss in this paper. 
26 SHARE did not collect questions on private pension entitlements through current employers.  
27 We also estimated models accounting for whether respondents or their spouse exhibited low 
cognitive abilities. Low cognition was measured by having a score below 1.5 standard 
deviations of the mean on immediate and delayed word recall for a particular age, gender, and 
educational achievement group. In general our measure of low cognition was not a significant 
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respondent’s spouse and household characteristics, including whether the spouse 
responded to the survey, whether the spouse works for pay, whether the spouse reports 
poor health, the spouse’s educational achievement, whether the spouse has a 
retirement plan through his or her employer in 2004 (U.S. only), whether the spouse’s 
job in 2004 is physically demanding, the spouse’s self-reported probability of living to 75 
in 2004, whether the couple owns their home, and the household’s assets.  
We estimate the model in Equation 4.1 using maximum likelihood. The model is 
estimated separately by gender and country. Estimation finds the model parameters 
that best fit the data for the U.S. and Germany discussed in Section 3. The model’s 
parameters include vectors 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂, 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺, and 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻 that capture coefficients on the 
respective explanatory factors, and 𝛽𝛽0, an intercept that partially captures the average 
probability of labor force exit independent of other explanatory factors, and 𝜎𝜎, the 
distribution of the unobserved component, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
The model is estimated separately for men and women. Studies have typically 
found that men and women differ in their willingness to supply labor. As noted earlier, 
Coile (2004) finds that both men and women respond to their Social Security incentives, 
but that men are more sensitive to their wives’ own pension incentives (i.e., if their wife 
has a strong incentive to continue working in order to grow their benefit, the husband 
will continue to work as well).  
B. Identification 
Our main parameters of interest are those related to SSW and PKV associated 
                                               
predictor of labor force exit. The exception was working married German women, but its 
inclusion did not have a substantive effect on the findings described in the next section. 
45 
with a worker’s own benefits and supplementary benefits they receive based on their 
spouse’s entitlement, and the worker’s spousal and survivor benefits paid to his or her 
spouse. Identification of model parameters requires that the factor of interest 
determines the parameter value and not a highly correlated factor omitted from the 
model. A well-identified model parameter can be interpreted as the relationship between 
the factor and the model’s outcome — in our case, initial labor force exit. A well-
identified model parameter does not imply causality. Causality additionally requires an 
experimental design or a convincing argument for why the factor of interest determines 
the outcome measure, not the other way around.  
None of our main parameters of interest are reported as part of the survey, rather 
they are constructed from harmonized survey responses and institutional details. It is, 
therefore, difficult to separately identify the relationship between the survey responses 
and the outcome of interest from the relationship between the constructed measure and 
the outcome of interest. For example, if pension benefit was a fixed multiplier based on 
final salary, then the relationship between the constructed pension measure and labor 
force exit would be equivalent to the relationship between reported final earnings and 
labor force exit, up to the multiplier. Identification may come indirectly based on policy 
differences that lead to independent variation in the constructed measure. For example, 
if the pension multiplier depends on hair color and hair color has no effect on income, 
then differences in labor force-exit rates for individuals of similar incomes but different 
hair colors, could reveal the additional incentive to leave the labor force based on a 
pension entitlement.  
Our measure of own SSW and PKV, based on Equation 2.2 and 2.3, depend on 
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last observed full-time earnings, age, gender (through mortality), and birth year. For the 
U.S., own SSW and PKV are primarily determined by the first three factors because our 
sample was born between 1943-1953 and the policy variables contributing to these 
factors are similar. Since we estimate Equation 4.1 conditional on gender, identification 
of SSW and PKV are based on differential labor force exit associated with nonlinearities 
in how pension benefits are computed and the age-based incentives to delay claiming. 
Using the example in Figure 1, own SSW increases by $4,900 between ages 62 and 63, 
$9,700 between 63 and 64, but the annual gain by year decreases to $4,500 between 
65 and 66, and then increases again $6,680 between 66 and 67.28 Absent Social 
Security, we would not expect labor force exit to follow such a pattern. In practice, 
estimates may be only insignificantly different from zero given that these differences are 
less than 3% of SSW.  
If own SSW includes the worker’s supplement (appendix Equation A.7), then 
additional factors contribute to the own SSW calculation, namely, the spouse’s own 
benefit entitlement and claiming age. As a result, there is significant variation in SSW 
and PKV in our sample based on factors independent of one’s own income and age, in 
addition to the last observed earnings variations. This additional variation is likely to 
exist for the low-income earner in a couple, so we expect that estimates of own SSW 
and PKV to be more clearly identified for women, since they are predominantly the low-
income earners in our sample of couples. 
Identification for spousal and survivor SSW is clearer cut. As demonstrated in 
                                               
28 The difference in gains reflects that the benefit to delay claiming is kinked (5% of PIA before 
63, 6.7% between 63 and 66, and 8% after) while the probability of death increases steadily 
over this age range. This leads to uneven accrual of SSW. 
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Table 2.2 and 2.3, an individual with a benefit entitlement at FRA of $2,000, which is 
determined primarily by income, will have very different incentives based on his or her 
spouse’s age and own benefit entitlement at FRA. As our sample differs along these 
dimensions and the consequences for SSW and PKV are substantial and nonlinear, 
there exists ample variation in the data to identify these relationships. 
C. Interpretation and limitations 
Interpretation of the parameters is based on our model choice and the strength of 
their identification. Since we estimate a Probit model, we compute the average marginal 
effects of the model’s explanatory factors to support the interpretation of our findings. 
Average marginal effects are computed by simulating the predicted change in labor 
force participation from incremental changes in the explanatory factor of interest, using 
the records in the sample and holding the values of all other explanatory factors 
constant.  
If well-identified, the average marginal effect of own SSW in Equation 4.1 
represents the change in the probability of labor force exit from an additional $1 of 
expected lifetime Social Security benefits, holding all other factors constant (e.g., 
assets, spousal characteristics). Those additional benefits are paid to the respondent. 
We interpret the average marginal effect of spousal or survivor SSW similarly, except 
that the benefit is paid to the respondent’s spouse while the respondent is alive or dead, 
respectively. If leisure is a normal good, then greater SSW in any form should increase 
a worker’s incentive to leave the labor force. Further, if workers have perfect information 
regarding their benefits and value benefits paid to their spouse the same as benefits 
paid directly to them, then they should value an additional $1 of SSW the same 
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regardless of source. If true, then the parameter estimates for all SSW measures should 
be positive and equal. If one is significantly greater than the others, then it suggests the 
respondent’s labor force exit is more responsive to those benefit levels, potentially 
because the benefit type is more salient or because the respondent values benefits paid 
to his or her spouse differently than benefits paid directly to them. All of this would be 
true if SSW was well-identified. Since our measure of own SSW is based on last 
observed earnings and not the actual earnings history, this means that it cannot be 
separated from the substitution effect of earnings — that is, greater earnings from 
continued work increase the opportunity cost of stopping work. Consequently, our 
estimates of own SSW will be a composite of the income effect from greater SSW and 
the substitution effect from greater income while working — the net effect of which will 
be ambiguous.  
If well-identified, the average marginal effect of own PKV in Equation 4.1 
represents the change in the labor force-exit probability from a possible $1 gain in SSW 
from delaying benefit claiming to a future peak age, where the gain is based on the 
respondent’s own earnings history and is paid to the respondent. Similar to SSW, the 
difference for spousal and survivor PKV parameters are when and to whom the benefits 
are paid. A positive PKV should incentivize delayed claiming. Further, an additional $1 
of PKV should have the same effect if workers have perfect information regarding their 
incentives to delay claiming and value benefits paid to their spouse the same as 
benefits paid directly to them.  
As previously noted, identification of own SSW and PKV may be difficult to 
identify separately from income and age. In a typical labor supply model, greater income 
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would be expected to encourage continued labor force participation, and if the value of 
leisure rises with age, then greater age would be expected to discourage labor force 
participation. The net impact on our estimates of SSW and PKV would be ambiguous. 
Therefore, in reporting our results, we focus on the directionality and relative values of 
the parameter estimates, rather than the magnitude of the point estimates.29 
5. Findings 
In this section, we present the findings from estimating the model in Equation 4.1 
for married working men and women in the U.S. and Germany.  
A. U.S. 
Table 5.1 presents marginal effects for the parameters of interest from the model 
presented in equation 4.1, where labor force exit is measured as the first post-2004 
period that a worker is no longer in the labor force (i.e., working or looking for work). For 
men and women, Table 5.1 begins by reporting the relationship between labor force exit 
and the SSW and PKV measures of interest (Model 1), and then adds respondent 
characteristics, except notably age and earnings (Model 2), then spousal and household 
                                               
29 Since our interest is in the relative relationship between own, spousal and survivor SSW and 
PKV (i.e., are they equal?), the ambiguous influence of income and age on parameter 
estimates only matters insofar as it disproportionately impacts one type of SSW or PKV over 
the other for explicable reasons. For example, age may have a greater influence on labor force 
exit for own SSW relative to survivor SSW if husbands believed that they would live longer on 
average than life tables would suggest. In this case, it could lead to husband’s weighting their 
own benefit more relative to the survivor benefit. We control for survey questions that may 
indicate when a respondent’s expectations about future payouts might differ from average, 
including self-reported expections of own and spousal probability of surviving to 75, self-
reported health, and difficulty of work, both as independent regressors and interacted with our 
SSW measures, but find no substantive impact to our findings. 
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characteristics (Model 3), and then age (Model 4). Marginal effects for all explanatory 
factors in the model are reported in Appendix C.  
Table 5.1. Marginal effects of probit model explaining first labor force exit (U.S.) 
 Men Women 
Explanatory 
Factors 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Own SSW 
($100,000) 
0.001 0.004 -0.005 -
0.016*** 
0.006 0.009* 0.002 -0.004 


















(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Spousal SSW 
($100,000) 
0.078*** 0.072** 0.041 -0.006 0.239*** 0.220*** 0.162*** 0.061 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) 
Spousal PKV 
($10,000) 
0.015** 0.015** 0.009 -0.004 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.034*** 0.013 









-0.019 -0.062 -0.051 -0.042 -0.023 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.053) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) 
Survivor PKV 
($10,000) 
0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.007** -0.012* -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 





-0.009 0.019 0.025 0.031 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 





-0.010 -0.011* -0.008 -0.005 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.004* 










X X   X X 
Include 
respondent age 
   
X    X 
Observations 5,492 5,492 5,492 5,492 5,225 5,225 5,225 5,225 
Note: Complete marginal estimates reported in Table C.1. Standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All monetary values indexed to 2019 values using OECD’s 
consumer price index (OECD 2021).   
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Recall from the previous section that we expect greater SSW to be associated 
with wealth effects, leading to labor force exit (positive coefficient) and greater PKV to 
be an incentive to remain in the labor force (negative coefficient). The simplest model, 
Model 1 highlights that for men and women, own PKV can provide strong incentives to 
continue work: Every additional $10,000 in PKV is associated with a decreased 
probability of labor force exit — 2.0 percentage points for men and 0.7 percentage 
points for women. For comparison, 12.5% of men and 15.3% of women exit the labor 
force per sample period, suggesting these are sizeable incentives to remain working. 
For women, consistent with theory, an additional $100,000 in SSW is associated with a 
0.6 percentage point greater probability of labor force exit. For men, the relationship is 
only 0.1 percentage point. Neither is  statistically different from zero. The weak SSW 
relationships reflect our inability to separately identify the income effect of greater SSW 
from the higher income substitution effect, as discussed in the last section.  
Moving across the models, we observe that as respondent, spousal, and 
household characteristics are added into the model, the marginal PKV estimates are 
slightly attenuated but remain statistically significant. Our measures appear robust to 
these potentially confounding factors. We also present results incorporating age for 
consistency with previous estimates in the literature, but since our constructed measure 
of PKV is primarily determined by age and SSW, we are unable to separately identify a 
relationship for PKV independent of age.30 For men, adding age reduces the 
relationship with PKV. For women, adding age similarly attenuates the SSW and PKV 
                                               
30 A simple regression of our own PKV measure on age and own SSW yields an R-squared of 
0.68 for men and 0.73 for women.  
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marginal effects. Our inability to separately identify age is reflective of strong age effect 
on SSW and PKV through mortality rates and the age-specific benefit adjustments 
(penalties and bonuses), as well as our measures’ construction. We speculate other 
authors have had more success including earnings and age because they use 
administrative earnings data, which leads to variation in earnings history independent of 
last observed earnings. For the rest of our narrative, we focus on the first three models, 
recognizing that our SSW measure cannot separately identify the income effect of 
greater wealth from the substitution effect of higher earnings and that our PKV measure 
cannot separately identify the incentive to continue working from Social Security 
benefits from a rising disutility of work with age. We argue that identifying these 
relationships is unnecessary for our research question. We are trying to establish 
whether the relationship between own PKV and labor force exit is the same as the 
relationship between PKV from spousal or survivor benefits and labor force exit. As long 
as the relationship between aging and labor force exit does not disproportionately affect 
the valuation of own benefits versus spousal or survivor benefits, then our models 
excluding age and earnings are sufficient to address whether the incentive to delay 
claiming from an additional $1 in future own benefits is valued the same as an additional 
$1 in future auxiliary benefits. 
Next we review the relationship between labor force exit and additional SSW and 
PKV from spousal benefits. Consistent with theory, additional SSW from spousal 
benefits is positively and significantly associated with labor force exit (7.8 percentage 
points for men and 23.9 percentage points for women). Adding in respondent, spousal, 
and household characteristics reduce the marginal effect estimates, although they 
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remain large and statistically significant for women. The statistically significant 
relationship for women is surprising. In our sample, it is rare that a spousal benefit 
would be paid to the husband of a working woman. For spousal PKV, we find a positive 
relationship with labor force exit for men in the simple model, suggesting that a greater 
incentive to delay benefit claiming is associated with greater labor force exit. This 
relationship disappears once we include spousal and household characteristics in the 
model. For women, the relationship with PKV is significant, but also opposite the 
expected sign. Combined with the large relationship for SSW and the relative rarity of 
additional SSW from spousal benefits for working women, we would caution interpreting 
the spousal SSW and PKV coefficients for women as they may reflect unmodeled 
factors associated with work among couples where the wife is the dominant earner. 
For men, we observe that additional SSW from the survivor benefit is 
counterintuitively negative and significantly related to labor force exit (4.1 percentage 
points per an additional $100,000). As with own benefits, this may reflect a stronger 
substitution effect associated with individuals entitled to these benefits, thereby 
dominating the income effect from greater SSW. This relationship is robust to 
accounting for additional respondent, spousal, and household characteristics. Additional 
PKV from the survivor benefit is, counterintuitively, positively associated with labor force 
exit (1.0 percentage points per an additional $10,000). This suggests that working, 
married men who could grow their benefit by delaying claiming are actually more likely 
to exit the labor force. This relationship is robust to accounting for additional 
respondent, spousal, and household characteristics, including respondent age. This 
relationship may reflect that respondents most likely to grow their survivor benefit from 
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delayed benefit claiming (e.g., a single-income household with a notably older husband) 
have other, unmodeled factors influencing their decision to leave work. While we do not 
interpret the coefficient to suggest that incentives to continue delay claiming lead to less 
work, the significant counterintuitive relationship leads us to conclude that husbands’ 
labor supply decisions are not responding to incentives built into the survivor benefit to 
delay claiming. Put another way, these incentives are not salient in a husband’s work 
decision.  
For women, additional survivor benefit SSW and PKV are negatively associated 
with labor force exit. As with additional spousal benefit SSW and PKV, it is rare that 
survivor benefits would be paid to a working woman’s husband. Similarly, we caution 
against interpreting the survivor SSW and PKV coefficients as they may be reflecting 
unmodeled factors. 
Finally, we consider the role of additional SSW and PKV from the worker’s 
supplement, focusing on married, working women, as they are the most likely to benefit 
from these supplements. Supplemental SSW from a worker’s spouse encourages labor 
force exit, and the relationship is statistically significant. Supplemental PKV, 
counterintuitively, is positively associated with labor force exit. As with the positive 
relationship estimated between survivor PKV and a husband’s labor force exit, we 
conclude the significant counterintuitive relationship indicates that wives’ labor supply 
decisions are not responding to incentives to alter their claiming decision timing. 
Our findings in Table 5.1 have presented a surprising mix of counterintuitive 
results for additional SSW and PKV from auxiliary benefits. Spousal and survivor 
benefits paid to the spouse have incentives that should alter a worker’s decision to 
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continue working and delay benefit claiming. We find no indication that men, for whom 
the incentives generally apply, are responsive to them. For the PKV from spousal and 
survivor benefits, the relationship operates in a counterintuitive direction. Supplemental 
benefits paid to the worker based on the spouse’s entitlement disincentivize work by 
reducing gains to a worker’s own benefit from additional work. For women, for whom 
they generally apply, we find that the relationship is also not consistent with theory. 
Taken as a whole, our results suggest a limited relationship between incentives for 
claiming built into spousal and survivor benefits and continued work. This contrasts with 
findings (both here and in the literature more broadly) that workers are responsive to 
incentives driven by their own benefit. Our interpretation is that incentives to delay 
claiming from auxiliary benefits are comparatively less salient than incentives to delay 
claiming from a worker’s own benefit. Next, we re-estimate our model with harmonized 
German data to explore whether survivor benefits and incentives to delay claiming are 
associated with retirement decisions in a policy settings where eligibility and benefit 
rules are simpler.  
B. Germany 
As with the U.S., Table 5.2 presents marginal effects for the parameters of 
interest from the model presented in Equation 4.1, where labor force exit is measured 
as the first post-2004 period that a worker is no longer in the labor force (i.e., working or 
looking for work). For men and women, Table 5.2 begins by reporting the relationship 
between labor force exit and the SSW and PKV measures of interest (Model 1), and 
then adds respondent characteristics except age and earnings (Model 2), then spousal   
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and household characteristics (Model 3), and then age (Model 4). Marginal effects for all 
explanatory factors in the model are reported in Appendix C.  
Table 5.2. Marginal effects of probit model explaining first labor force exit 
(Germany) 





















0.029** 0.020 0.022 0.013 0.042** 0.033* 0.017 0.004 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Own PKV 
(€10,000) 
-0.029*** -0.022*** -0.016** -0.004 -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.007 0.001 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Survivor SSW 
(€100,000) 
0.057 0.070 0.086 0.088 -0.389 -0.349 -0.537 -0.336 
(0.074) (0.088) (0.085) (0.080) (0.430) (0.440) (0.470) (0.426) 
Survivor PKV 
(€10,000) 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.018 0.024 0.043 0.021 -0.009 





0.165 0.194 0.203 0.126 -0.041 -0.032 -0.107 -0.071 





0.072 0.066 0.041 0.012 0.012 0.018 0.014 0.007 










X X   X X 
Include 
respondent age 
   
X    X 
Observations 431 431 425 425 453 451 446 446 
Note: Complete marginal estimates reported in Table C.2. Standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All monetary values indexed to 2019 values using OECD’s 
consumer price index (OECD 2021).   
Unlike the U.S. estimates, the German estimates in the simple model are broadly 
consistent with theory: SSW is associated with labor force exit (positive coefficient) and 
greater PKV, reflecting an incentive to remain in the labor force, discourages labor force 
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exit (negative coefficient). The simplest model, Model 1, highlights that for men and 
women, own PKV can provide strong incentives to continue work: Every additional 
10,000 euros in PKV is associated with a decreased probability of labor force exit, 2.9 
percentage points for men and 2.1 percentage points for women. For women, 
consistent with theory, an additional 100,000 euros in SSW is associated with a 2.9 
percentage point greater probability of labor force exit, and for men the relationship is 
only 4.2 percentage points.  
Moving across the models, we observe that as respondent, spousal, and 
household characteristics are added into the model, the marginal PKV estimates are 
attenuated but remain negative and statistically significant for men. As with the U.S., we 
also present results incorporating age for consistency with previous estimates in the 
literature, but emphasize our constructed PKV measure is primarily determined by age 
and SSW, so we are unable to separately identify a relationship for PKV independent of 
age. For men, adding age eliminates the statistically significant relationship with PKV. 
For women, the relationship for both SSW and PKV is weakened by the inclusion of 
spousal and household characteristics.  
Survivor benefits paid to the spouse have incentives that should encourage a 
worker to continue working and delay benefit claiming. Focusing on men, for whom 
these benefits are substantial (see Table 3.2 and 3.3), we estimate an insignificant, 
positive relationship. For the survivor benefit PKV, the relationship is negative but not 
statistically different from zero or the estimated relationship between own PKV and labor 
force exit. Supplemental benefits paid to the worker based on the spouse’s entitlement 
disincentivize work by reducing gains to a worker’s own benefit from additional work. 
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For women, for whom they generally apply, we find that the relationship is positive 
(inconsistent with theory) and not significantly different from zero.  
Comparing labor force responses from incentives to delay benefit claiming in the 
U.S. to Germany (using Model 3 in Tables 5.1 and 5.2), we find that own PKV for 
working men is associated with labor force exit. This is consistent with past work 
focusing on the retirement responsiveness of men to Social Security benefits (Börsch-
Supan et al. 2004; Coile and Gruber 2007). For married, working women the 
relationship appears to be smaller and is statistically insignificant for Germany, although 
that may reflect the substantially smaller sample size in SHARE. For married, working 
men in the U.S., survivor PKV is counterintuitively associated with greater labor force 
exit: It is both significantly different from zero and the estimated response from own 
PKV. In Germany, the relationship is consistent with theory, but not statistically different 
from zero or the estimated response from own PKV. The finding suggests that 
incentives associated with the survivor benefit in the U.S. are not salient, but the same 
cannot be conclusively said for Germany. We note that for Germany, the results are 
consistent with theory, just not statistically significant due, in part, to a small sample 
size. Regarding supplemental benefit PKV, the estimates in the U.S. and Germany are 
both positively associated with labor force exit for married, working women, a 
counterintuitive result. In the U.S., the counterintuitive estimate is both significantly 
different from zero and the estimated response from own PKV. In Germany, the 
estimate is not statistically different from either. This suggests that incentives to delay 
claiming are not salient in the U.S. and inconclusive in Germany.  
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6. Conclusions 
We find that incentives to alter benefit claiming timing built into auxiliary U.S. 
Social Security benefits, such as spousal and survivor benefits, are unrelated to labor 
supply decisions. This finding is consistent with recent survey evidence from an online 
representative panel of American households that suggests that knowledge of eligibility 
rules for these benefits is low (Carman and Hung 2018). A U.S. worker’s benefit 
payment depends on a complex interaction of own claiming decisions and his or her 
spouse’s claiming decisions. The lack of responsiveness may reflect the complexity of 
benefit rules or that benefits paid to a worker’s spouse are not salient in the worker’s 
decision-making.  
To provide a benchmark, we examine Germany where survivor benefits create 
similar incentives for retirement timing. German survivor benefits are largely 
independent of the survivor’s decision, making the benefit calculation and resulting 
incentives easier to understand. Given the small sample size, the German analysis is 
inconclusive. However, the findings are consistent with survivor benefits influencing 
married, working men’s labor supply decisions.  
Our findings have implications for Social Security policy. When created by the 
1939 Social Security amendments, spousal and survivor benefits were intended to 
provide “life-time family security instead of only individual old age security to the 
workers in insured occupations” (Roosevelt 1939). A lack of policy salience may be 
desirable in old-age insurance if the incentives encourage early labor market exit. The 
design of U.S. spousal benefits is an example. A spouse cannot collect her spousal 
benefits until the worker claims his benefit. This design theoretically promotes early 
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claiming for households eligible for this benefit. Early claiming encourages these 
households to take lower lifetime monthly benefits, placing them at greater risk of 
financial insecurity in retirement, particularly in widowhood. Alternatively, the design of 
survivor benefits rewards delayed benefit claiming through increases in the monthly 
benefit. These incentives a designed to encourage working longer. We find married 
workers do not respond to the incentives associated with spousal and survivor benefits 
even if doing so would enhance their retirement security. Additional education and 
outreach may increase couples’ understanding of how individual claiming decisions 
influence each person’s benefits while alive and in widowhood. 
Our findings also have implications for analyses of retirement benefits’ potential 
impact on households’ retirement decisions. Recent studies evaluating the potential 
impact of reducing or eliminating spousal or survivor benefits (Knapp 2014; Borella et al. 
2019; Nishiyama 2019) using structural models of household decision-making assume 
that potential income sources are treated equally. In the context of own, spousal, and 
survivor retirement benefits, our findings suggest that this is not true. If spousal and 
survivor benefits are not salient, then the predictions by many structural models are 
unlikely to be valid.  Our findings suggest caution when interpreting model predictions of 
labor supply responses from potential changes to own and auxiliary benefit policy. 
Future research into benefits’ salience may reveal certain types of couples where these 
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Appendix A. Technical details of social security wealth estimates 
To estimate SSW and the PKV, we must first estimate earnings histories and 
then use these histories to estimate potential future benefits if the individual continues to 
work.  
Estimation of earnings 
Pension benefits depend on earnings over the life cycle. To estimate potential 
pension benefits, life-cycle earnings need to be known or estimated. Earnings histories 
are not collected as part of the HRS (for the U.S.) or SHARE (for Germany). The HRS 
has an administrative data linkage that includes earnings histories for respondents who 
consent to having their records matched. SHARE does not collect earnings histories but 
does collect work histories, and final earnings in each employment spell. Comparing the 
use of actual earnings histories reported in Social Security administrative earnings data 
leads to a simple approach of projecting life-cycle earnings histories based on last 
observed earnings. Knapp et al. (2019) find that the simple approach captures the 
majority of the variation associated with incentives to delay benefit claiming and 
performs similarly to an approach that accounts for work history. Following their 
approach, we predict life-‘cycle earning trajectories based on major labor force surveys 
in each country and use last observed full-time earnings to estimate life-cycle earnings 
for each respondent and their spouse.31 
                                               
31 A consequence of using this approach is that own pension benefit levels are determined by 
final earnings, so we cannot identify the relationship between labor force exit and own SSW 
separately from the relationship between labor force exit and final earnings. 
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Computation of U.S. pension benefit 
We compute the U.S. own pension benefit based on the following formula: 
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎(𝑠𝑠, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) × 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜.𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖)  (A.1) 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎(⋅) corresponds to the cost-of-living adjustment for person 𝑝𝑝 in year 𝑠𝑠 as set 
by the U.S. Social Security Administration, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜.𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(⋅) reflects benefit adjustments 
due to claiming them before or after the FRA (see Table 2.1 for an example). Finally, 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎(⋅) stands for the function for computing the worker’s PIA based on 𝑝𝑝’s lifecycle 
earnings, EARNis, accrued through period 𝑠𝑠 and accounting for a progressive formula, 
depending on 𝑝𝑝’s birth year, for transforming average earnings into the monthly benefit 
at FRA.  
Spouse i’s spousal benefits based on worker j’s earnings history are computed 
using the following equation: 
 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = �
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎�𝑠𝑠, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖� × 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝.𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) × 0.5 × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 , 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖� , if 𝑗𝑗 claimed 
(𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑠𝑠)
0 , otherwise
    (A.2) 
Spouse i’s survivor benefits based on worker j’s earnings history are computed 
using the following equation: 





⎧𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎�𝑠𝑠, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖� × 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏.𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖� , if  𝑗𝑗 never claimed
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎�𝑠𝑠, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖� × max{𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏.𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) , if  𝑗𝑗 claimed
     × 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜.𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈�𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�, 0.715� × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�
0 , otherwise
    (A.3) 
Computation of German pension benefit 
Similarly, we compute pension benefits in Germany based on the following 
formula: 
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠,𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) × 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜.𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠,𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)  (A.4) 
67 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(⋅) corresponds to the pension point valuation in year 𝑠𝑠 depending on 
whether respondent i lives in East or West Germany (as indicated by 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖), which is 
updated annually by GRV, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(⋅) is the multiplier on the benefit entitlement 
reflecting changes from claiming own benefits before or after the FRA (see Table 2.2 for 
an example). Finally, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(⋅) reflects the worker i’s cumulative pension points based on 
his life-cycle earnings accrued through period 𝑠𝑠 and accounting whether respondent i 
lives in East or West Germany.  
Germany does not offer spousal benefits like those in the U.S.32 However, 
spouse j’s survivor benefits based on worker i’s earnings history are computed using the 
following equation: 





⎧𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠,𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) × 0.55 × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖� , if  𝑗𝑗 never claimed
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠,𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) × 0.55 × 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜.𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖� , if  𝑗𝑗 claimed
     × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎�𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 , 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�
0 , otherwise
    (A.5) 
The survivor benefit is income tested, meaning it is reduced based on other 
income the survivor receives. The income test includes own pension income. To 
compute the reduction amount,  net income must be computed first. If income is from 
own pension benefits, net income is 87% of the own benefit received (86% for survivors 
married before 2002). From net income, excess net income is determined by 
differencing net income from an exempt amount (equal to 26.4 times the current year’s 
pension point value). The reduction in the spousal benefit is then computed as 40% of 
the excess net income.  
                                               
32 As mentioned in section 2, an exception is pension splitting, which we do not incorporate into 
our analysis.  
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Computation of social security wealth and peak value  
Own pension benefit (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ) of an individual i depends on claiming age, the 
individual’s earnings history up to time t and the benefit formula in country c. Own SSW 
(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ) is a measure of the expected present discounted value of all future own 
pension benefits. Thus: 
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) =
𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡
inf (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖)
× Pr(𝑝𝑝 s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) × ∑ �
𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠−𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
inf (𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)
� × 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 × Pr(𝑝𝑝 s.t. 𝑠𝑠 |𝑝𝑝 s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠=𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  (A.6) 
where 𝛽𝛽 is a real discount factor, inf (𝑡𝑡2, 𝑡𝑡1) is the cumulative inflation between 𝑡𝑡1 and 
future period 𝑡𝑡2. Pr(𝑝𝑝 s.t. 𝑠𝑠 |𝑝𝑝 s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) represents the probability of individual i surviving to 
(s.t.), a future period s conditional on his or her survival to claiming age 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖. Survival 
probabilities are age- and gender-specific and are based on predictions from the Human 
Mortality Database (2021). We calculate the present value of SSW at the claiming age 
back to the survey period, time t. 
SSW in equation A.6 may misrepresent 𝑝𝑝’s incentives if i is eligible for auxiliary 
benefits based on his or her spouse’s contribution history because being eligible for 
spousal benefits might reduce or eliminate own benefits (e.g., if the spouse is older or 
has greater lifetime earnings). Accounting for 𝑝𝑝’s potential spousal and survivor benefits 
yield a modified version of Equation A.6 that reflects individual 𝑝𝑝 and spouse 𝑗𝑗’s 
probability of joint survival, the age of j’s death (𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖), and whether  j has not claimed her 
benefit prior to her death (i.e., 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖). Once eligible for benefits, 𝑝𝑝 is eligible for his 
own pension benefit and potentially a spousal supplement (sp.ben) if his own pension is 
low enough and his spouse, j, is alive. In the United States, after j’s death, i is eligible 
for a survivor benefit instead of the spousal benefit. In Germany, the survivor benefit is 
independent of one’s own benefit entitlement. Accounting for spousal and survivor 
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benefits for i based on j’s benefit entitlement leads to an expanded formula for i’s own 
SSW that accounts for the interactions of own and spousal benefits (sp.int) and own 
and survivor benefits (sur.int): 
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐� (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) =
𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡
inf (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖)




  × �sp. int�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 � × Pr(𝑝𝑝 & 𝑗𝑗 s.t. 𝑠𝑠 |𝑝𝑝 & 𝑗𝑗 s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)
        +sur. int�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑗𝑗 claimed)�
            × Pr(only 𝑝𝑝 s.t. 𝑠𝑠 |𝑝𝑝 & 𝑗𝑗  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) × Pr (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  |𝑝𝑝 & 𝑗𝑗  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)
        +sur. int�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑗𝑗 never claimed)�








  × �sur. int�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑗𝑗 claimed)�
            × Pr(only 𝑝𝑝 s.t. 𝑠𝑠 |only 𝑝𝑝  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) × Pr (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  |only 𝑝𝑝  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)
       +sur. int�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏.𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑗𝑗 never claimed�
            × Pr(only 𝑝𝑝 s.t. 𝑠𝑠 |only 𝑝𝑝  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) × �1 − Pr (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  |only 𝑝𝑝  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)��
 (A.6) 
where  
sp. int�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 � = �
max�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 � if c=U.S.
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 if c = Germany
 
sur. int�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑗𝑗 claim)� = �
max�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑗𝑗 claim)� if c=U.S.
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑗𝑗 claim) if c = Germany
 
We compute the SSW associated with the worker’s supplement (i.e., the 
additional benefit he receives based on spousal and survivor benefits he is paid based 
on his spouse’s earnings history) as the difference between Equations A.6 and A.6’: 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 �𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖� = 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐� �𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖� − 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) (A.7) 
We compute additional SSW from spousal benefits based on individual i’s 
earnings history that are paid to spouse j. SSW of individual i's spousal benefit at time t 
if benefits start at claim age (cai) reflects the additional benefits received by spouse j 
based on individual i’s pension record while i is alive. The spousal benefit also depends 
70 
on the spouse’s benefit claiming behavior and the spouse’s own benefit  based on his or 
her earnings. Additional SSW from spouse benefits is computed as: 
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) =
𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡
inf (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖)




      × max�𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 −  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 0� × Pr(𝑝𝑝 & 𝑗𝑗 s.t. 𝑠𝑠 |𝑝𝑝 & 𝑗𝑗 s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)
        (A.8) 
We also compute SSW from individual i's survivor pension benefit based on 
claim age 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖. SSW of individual i's survivor benefit reflects the additional benefits 
received by spouse j based on individual i’s pension record if individual i has died but 
spouse j is still alive. The survivor benefit also depends on the spouse’s benefit claiming 
behavior and, in the U.S., the spouse’s own benefit  based on his or her own earnings. 
Additional SSW from survivor benefit is computed using the following equation 
accounting for the country specific rules for the interactions of own and survivor benefits 
(sur.add): 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) =
𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡
inf (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖)




  × �sur. add�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑝𝑝 claimed)�
            × Pr(only 𝑗𝑗 s.t. 𝑠𝑠 |𝑝𝑝 & 𝑗𝑗  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) × Pr (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  |𝑝𝑝 & 𝑗𝑗  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)
        +sur. add�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑝𝑝 never claimed)�








  × �sur. add�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑝𝑝 claimed)�
            × Pr(only 𝑗𝑗 s.t. 𝑠𝑠 |only 𝑗𝑗  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) × Pr (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  |only 𝑗𝑗  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)
       +sur. add�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑝𝑝 never claimed)�
            × Pr(only 𝑗𝑗 s.t. 𝑠𝑠 |only 𝑗𝑗  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) × (1 − Pr (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  |only 𝑗𝑗  s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖))}
  (A.9) 
where  
sur. add�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑝𝑝 claim)� = �
max�𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑝𝑝 claim)-𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 , 0� if c=U.S.




Appendix B. Pension policy details 
Table B.1: Adjustments for early or delayed benefit claiming 
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1931 65 5% 65 63 65 / 60 45 
1932 65 5% 65 63 65 / 60 45 
1933 65 6% 65 63 65 / 60 45 
1934 65 6% 65 63 65 / 60 45 
1935 65 6% 65 63 65 / 60 45 
1936 65 6% 65 63 65 / 60 45 
1937 65 7% 65 63 65 / 60 45 
1938 65 and 2 mo. 7% 65 63 65 / 60 45 
1939 65 and 4 mo. 7% 65 63 65 / 60 45 
1940 65 and 6 mo. 7% 65 and 2 mo. 63 65 / 60 45 
1941 65 and 8 mo. 8% 65 and 4 mo. 63 65 / 61 45 
1942 65 and 10 mo. 8% 65 and 6 mo. 63 65 / 62 45 
1943 66 8% 65 and 8 mo. 63 65 / 63 45 
1944 66 8% 65 and 10 mo. 63 65 / 64 45 
1945 66 8% 66 63 65 45 
1946 66 8% 66 63 65 45 
1947 66 8% 66 63 65 and 1 mo. 45 and 1 mo. 
1948 66 8% 66 63 65 and 2 mo. 45 and 2 mo. 
1949 66 8% 66 63 65 and 3 mo. 45 and 3 mo. 
1950 66 8% 66 63 65 and 4 mo. 45 and 4 mo. 
1951 66 8% 66 63 65 and 5 mo. 45 and 5 mo. 
1952 66 8% 66 63 65 and 6 mo. 45 and 6 mo. 
1953 66 8% 66 63 and 2 mo. 65 and 7 mo. 45 and 7 mo. 
1954 66 8% 66 63 and 4 mo. 65 and 8 mo. 45 and 8 mo. 
1955 66 and 2 mo. 8% 66 63 and 6 mo. 65 and 9 mo. 45 and 9 mo. 
1956 66 and 4 mo. 8% 66 63 and 8 mo. 65 and 10 mo. 45 and 10 mo. 
1957 66 and 6 mo. 8% 66 and 2 mo. 63 and 10 mo. 65 and 11 mo. 45 and 11 mo. 
1958 66 and 8 mo. 8% 66 and 4 mo. 64 66 46 
1959 66 and 10 mo. 8% 66 and 6 mo. 64 and 2 mo. 66 and 2 mo. 46 and 2 mo. 
1960 67 8% 66 and 8 mo. 64 and 4 mo. 66 and 4 mo. 46 and 4 mo. 
1961 67 8% 66 and 10 mo. 64 and 6 mo. 66 and 6 mo. 46 and 6 mo. 
1962 67 8% 67 64 and 8 mo. 66 and 8 mo. 46 and 8 mo. 
1963 67 8% 67 64 and 10 mo. 66 and 10 mo. 46 and 10 mo. 
1964 67 8% 67 65 67 47 
1965 67 8% 67 65 67 47 
1966 67 8% 67 65 67 47 
1967 67 8% 67 65 67 47 
1968 67 8% 67 65 67 47 
1969 67 8% 67 65 67 47 
1970 67 8% 67 65 67 47 
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Appendix C. Supplemental tables 
Table C.1. Marginal effects of probit model explaining first labor force exit (U.S.) 























0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.016*** 0.006 0.009* 0.002 -0.004 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Own PKV 
($10,000) 
-0.020*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.002 




-0.007 0.007 -0.052 -0.107*** 0.352*** 0.381*** 0.271** 0.110 




0.078*** 0.072** 0.041 -0.006 0.239*** 0.220*** 0.162*** 0.061 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) 
Spouse PKV 
($10,000) 
0.015** 0.015** 0.009 -0.004 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.034*** 0.013 




-0.041*** -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.019 -0.062 -0.051 -0.042 -0.023 




0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.007** -0.012* -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 





-0.009 0.019 0.025 0.031 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 





-0.010 -0.011* -0.008 -0.005 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.004* 





- - - - - - - - 










 -0.000 0.001 -0.001  -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Marriage 
length 
 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000  0.001** 0.001 -0.000 





 0.107*** 0.096*** 0.061**  0.055** 0.065** 0.035 




 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.121***  0.177*** 0.169*** 0.167*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)  (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
Education: 
At least a 
college 
degree 
 -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.044***  -0.018 -0.008 -0.007 




living to 75 
 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 





living to 75 
 -0.018 -0.016 -0.018  0.020 0.026 0.022 







 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.046***  0.007 0.009 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Job in 2004 
is physically 
demanding  
 0.015 0.014 0.015  0.027** 0.025** 0.028** 





  -0.051* -0.065**   -0.077** -0.076** 




  -0.039*** -0.032***   -0.056*** -0.042*** 




  0.024 0.025   -0.011 -0.010 
  (0.024) (0.024)   (0.024) (0.024) 
Spouse 
education: 
At least a 
college 
degree 
  -0.011 -0.008   -0.025** -0.026** 









  0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Spouse’s 
job in 2004 
is physically 
demanding  
  0.007 0.004   0.015 -0.002 




living to 75 
  0.014 0.018*   0.007 0.016 
  (0.010) (0.010)   (0.011) (0.011) 
Missing 
spouse self-
rpt. prob. of 
living to 75 
  0.010 0.016   -0.013 -0.009 
  (0.013) (0.014)   (0.015) (0.015) 
Couple 
own’s home 
  0.012 0.005   -0.001 -0.004 




  0.001 0.000   0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 




Wave 7)         
Wave 8 
(2006) 
  0.010 -0.011   -0.014 -0.039** 
  (0.012) (0.015)   (0.013) (0.015) 
Wave 9 
(2008)   0.041*** 0.003   0.026* -0.016  
  (0.014) (0.016)   (0.015) (0.017) 
Wave 10 
(2010)   0.049*** -0.007   0.045*** -0.014  
  (0.015) (0.017)   (0.017) (0.019) 
Wave 11 
(2012)   0.044*** -0.024   0.021 -0.048**  
  (0.016) (0.018)   (0.018) (0.020) 
Wave 12 
(2014)   0.077*** -0.006   0.072*** -0.014  
  (0.020) (0.020)   (0.022) (0.023) 
Age    0.016***    0.013***     (0.002)    (0.002)          
Observation
s 5,492 5,492 5,492 5,492 5,225 5,225 5,225 5,225 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All monetary values indexed to 2019 




Table C.2. Marginal Effects of Probit Model Explaining First Labor Force Exit (Germany) 























0.029** 0.020 0.022 0.013 0.042** 0.033* 0.017 0.004 










0.018*** -0.007 0.001 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Missing own 
SSW/PKV 
0.109 0.297 0.223 0.063 0.060 0.057 0.111 0.063 
(0.164) (0.208) (0.205) (0.170) (0.057) (0.071) (0.079) (0.078) 
Spouse SSW 
(€100,000) 
- - - - - - - - 
        
Spouse PKV 
(€10,000) 
- - - - - - - - 




0.057 0.070 0.086 0.088 -0.389 -0.349 -0.537 -0.336 




-0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.018 0.024 0.043 0.021 -0.009 





0.165 0.194 0.203 0.126 -0.041 -0.032 -0.107 -0.071 





0.072 0.066 0.041 0.012 0.012 0.018 0.014 0.007 





- - - - - - - - 





- - - - - - - - 




 0.004 0.010* 0.005  -0.009* -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Marriage 
length 
 0.008*** 0.006** -0.001  0.006** 0.009*** 0.006** 





 0.365*** 0.251** 0.020  0.199 0.404*** 0.271** 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.133)  (0.143) (0.134) (0.135) 
Self-reported 
poor health 
 0.099 0.160* 0.135*  0.187** 0.146 0.140* 
 (0.082) (0.093) (0.081)  (0.088) (0.092) (0.083) 
Education: 
At least a  -0.035 -0.042 
-
0.089***  0.020 -0.025 -0.037 






living to 75 









living to 75 
 0.251*** 0.446*** 0.315**  - - - 
 (0.073) (0.146) (0.147)     
Lived in East 
Germany in 
1990 
 0.018 0.035 0.035  -0.034 -0.046 -0.037 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)  (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Job in 2004 
is physically 
demanding  
 0.017 0.008 -0.004  0.007 -0.028 -0.017 





  -0.088 -0.096   -0.079 -0.021 








0.112***   -0.089** -0.036 




  0.062 0.077   -0.106 -0.090 
  (0.091) (0.086)   (0.072) (0.073) 
Spouse 
education: 
At least a 
college 
degree 
  0.009 0.028   0.122*** 0.113*** 




living to 75 
  -0.003 -0.002   0.006*** 0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Missing 
spouse self-
rpt. prob. of 
living to 75 
  -0.146 -0.071   0.469*** 0.437*** 
  (0.141) (0.143)   (0.123) (0.121) 
Spouse’s job 
in 2004 is 
physically 
demanding 
  0.072 0.043   0.045 0.026 
  (0.046) (0.044)   (0.056) (0.056) 
Couple 
own’s home 
  0.078** 0.083**   0.028 0.036 




  -0.013** 
-
0.015***   -0.001 -0.005 






Wave 7)         
Wave 2 
(2006) 
  0.068* 0.023   0.187*** 0.173*** 
  (0.039) (0.044)   (0.048) (0.050) 
Wave 4 
(2010)   0.072 -0.060   -0.030 -0.103**  
  (0.053) (0.053)   (0.042) (0.046) 
Wave 5 
(2012)   0.011 -0.107**   0.045 -0.070  
  (0.051) (0.051)   (0.054) (0.053) 
Wave 6 
(2014)   0.146* -0.047   0.190*** 0.001  
  (0.084) (0.066)   (0.071) (0.067) 
Age    0.035***    0.029***     (0.009)    (0.008)          
Observations 431 431 425 425 453 451 446 446 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All monetary values indexed to 2019 
values using OECD’s consumer price index (OECD 2021).   
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Appendix D. Attrition analysis 
Table D.1 analyzes the sample’s attrition between survey waves starting in 2004 
and 2006 relative to the most expansive specification chosen in Section 5. A statistically 
positive relationship means that the explanatory factor is associated continued 
participation in the survey. We omit those who die between survey waves from this 
analysis.33 First, we consider how our explanatory factors of interest, SSW and PKV, 
are related to attrition, and then we consider the relationship between our other 
explanatory factors and attrition. 
In the U.S., own SSW and PKV are not associated with attrition. However, some 
of the auxiliary benefit measures are related — namely spouse’s SSW and PKV and 
worker’s supplement PKV (men only) are associated with greater survey attrition 
between the 2004 and 2006 surveys, while greater survivor SSW (men only) is 
associated with greater survey continuation. In contrast to the U.S., own SSW for 
German men is associated with greater attrition and a greater PKV is associated with 
less attrition. For German women, greater supplemental SSW and PKV are associated 
with greater attrition. For Germany, to the degree that our pension measures are 
associated with attrition, the pattern suggests that those entitled to greater SSW and 
who have less incentive to delay claiming based on their own benefit are more likely to 
attrit.  
In Germany, we find that married, working men who attrit between 2004 and 
2006 are more likely to report being in poor health, living in West Germany prior to 
                                               
33 This corresponds to 10 men and eight women in the HRS and none in SHARE. 
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1990, having a larger age gap with their spouse, having a spouse working for pay, and 
haveing greater household assets. German married, working women who attrit are more 
likely to missing information on household assets, but are less likely to be home owners 
(12 percentage points less likely to attrit). A similar analysis for the U.S. reveals that 
working, married men are more likely to attrit if they have more assets (1 percentage 
point per $1 million in household assets), have missing information on marital length, 
their own or their spouse’s self-reported probability of survival to 75, or their spouse 
does not respond to the survey, but are less likely to attrit if they are older in 2004 (1.0 
percentage point per year). Working, married women are more likely to attrit if they have 
missing information on their own or their spouse’s self-reported probability of survival to 
75, or if their spouse does not respond to the survey. They are less likely to attrit if they 
are older in 2004 (0.6 percentage point per year). 
Table D.1. Marginal effects of probit model explaining nonattrition between 2004 
and 2006 interview  
 HRS - U.S. SHARE - Germany 
Explanatory Factors Men Women Men Women 
Own SSW ($/€100,000) -0.009 -0.011 -0.089** -0.032 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.039) (0.056) 
Own PKV ($/€10,000) 0.005 0.002 0.023* 0.003 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) 
Missing own SSW/PKV - - -0.126 -0.143   
(0.174) (0.121) 
Spouse SSW ($/€100,000) -0.106* -0.167* - - 
(0.062) (0.099)   
Spouse PKV ($/€10,000) -0.019* -0.026* - - 
(0.011) (0.014)   
Survivor SSW ($/€100,000) 0.054* -0.029 -0.215 -0.485 
(0.028) (0.067) (0.220) (0.775) 
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Survivor PKV ($/€10,000) -0.002 0.005 0.037 -0.004 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.030) (0.087) 
SSW from worker’s 
supplement ($/€100,000) 
-0.016 -0.001 -0.515 -0.211** 
(0.029) (0.013) (0.345) (0.103) 
PKV from worker’s 
supplement ($/€10,000) 
-0.024** -0.002 -0.020 -0.048** 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.067) (0.023) 
Missing spouse/ survivor 
SSW/PKV 
0.061* -0.023 -0.152 -0.045 
(0.034) (0.029) (0.123) (0.150) 
Age difference with spouse -0.002 0.001 -0.015* 0.005 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) 
Marriage length -0.001* -0.001 0.001 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Missing marriage length 
(indicator) 
-0.117** -0.061 0.040 0.297 
(0.047) (0.039) (0.235) (0.257) 
Self-reported poor health -0.057 0.021 (omit -2) 0.040 
(0.044) (0.044)  (0.182) 
Education: At least a college 
degree 
0.020 0.021 -0.063 0.043 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.064) (0.064) 
Self-reported prob. of living 
to 75 
-0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) 
Missing self-reported prob. 
of living to 75 
-0.046* -0.062*** -0.442 -0.222 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.343) (0.346) 
Has retirement plan through 
employer in 2004 
0.005 0.011 -- -- 
(0.015) (0.013)   
Respondent lived in East 
Germany prior to 1990 
  0.200*** 0.090 
  (0.073) (0.073) 
Job in 2004 is physically 
demanding  
-0.002 0.017 0.046 0.092 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.071) (0.063) 
Spouse did not respond to 
survey (indicator) 
-0.081* -0.178*** -0.019 -0.082 
(0.045) (0.034) (0.256) (0.162) 
Spouse works for pay  0.001 -0.019 -0.154* -0.016 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.089) (0.108) 
Spouse reports poor health 0.001 -0.005 -0.030 -0.230 
(0.034) (0.030) (0.191) (0.227) 
Spouse education: At least a 
college degree 
0.005 0.006 0.013 -0.107 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.073) (0.071) 
Spouse has retirement plan 
through employer in 2004 
0.000 -0.000 -- -- 
(0.000) (0.000)   
Spouse self-reported prob. 
of living to 75 
-0.065** -0.033 0.004 0.002 
(0.029) (0.022) (0.003) (0.003) 
Missing spouse self-rpt. 
prob. of living to 75 
0.000 -0.030** 0.239 0.142 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.340) (0.244) 
Spouse’s job in 2004 is 
physically demanding 
-0.013 -0.012 0.124 0.077 
(0.022) (0.017) (0.088) (0.100) 
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Couple own’s home -0.014 0.017 0.070 0.120** 
(0.027) (0.022) (0.065) (0.060) 
Household assets ($100,000) -0.001** -0.001 0.012* 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.003) 
Household assets missing 
(indicator) 
- - -0.087 -0.558** 
  (0.173) (0.250) 
Age 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.028* 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) (0.015) 
     
Observations 1,484 1,456 326 317 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  (omit - X) means that X 
observations were dropped because they were perfectly associated with the outcome. 
